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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN ASHLEY ROGERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920458-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.) provides 
this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first degree 
felony criminal conviction from the district court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did Detective Willden violate Article I section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution in forcing open the front door to Mr. Rogers' home 
during the course of a warrantless drug investigation? 
2. Was the search warrant invalid because it was obtained 
by the use of evidence garnered through the violation of Mr. Rogers* 
Fourth Amendment and Article I section 14 rights? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court normally defers to the trial court's findings 
of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and reviews legal 
conclusions without deference for correctness. E.g. State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991). Because the trial 
court never articulated his analysis on the record in any way prior 
to signing the findings and conclusions created by the prosecutor, 
the findings are entitled to less deference than normally would be 
due. See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 
1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with 
approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 
1990). See also State v. Mirquet. Case No. 920066-CA, (Utah App. 
slip opinion filed December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 of this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional provisions: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Rogers with four counts of possession 
of a controlled substance (R. 7-10). Trial counsel filed a motion 
to suppress evidence seized in violation of Mr. Rogers7 rights 
guaranteed by Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
(R. 28). Trial counsel challenged both the warrantless entry into 
Mr. Rogers7 home, and the warrant obtained as a result of evidence 
gained during the warrantless entry (R. 36-61). 
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After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court took the 
motion under advisement, allowing the parties to submit additional 
memoranda (R. 209-210). A minute entry dated May 15, 1992 indicates 
that the court would rule on the motion on May 18, 1992 (R. 79), but 
there is no minute entry for May 18, 1992. At a hearing on May 20, 
1992, trial counsel indicated his understanding that the trial court 
had denied the motion to suppress (R. 213), but the record does not 
indicate how trial counsel learned this. The State dismissed three 
of the counts, and the trial court entered a conviction for one 
count of possession on the basis of stipulated facts (R. 213-219). 
At this hearing, the court noted that the court was in the process 
of preparing his findings of fact relating to the denial of the 
motion to suppress, and allowed Mr. Rogers the opportunity to 
nullify the conviction based on stipulated facts in the event that 
trial counsel was dissatisfied with the courts findings of fact (R. 
216-217). 
At the sentencing hearing on July 10, 1992, trial counsel 
and the prosecutor submitted separate proposed findings and 
conclusions (R. 108). The trial court indicated that he would 
evaluate them and perhaps prepare his own (R. 108). The trial court 
allowed trial counsel to withdraw from representing Mr. Rogers at 
the sentencing hearing on July 10, 1992, and appointed the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association to represent Mr. Rogers on appeal (R. 
91). On July 15, 1992, the trial court signed the findings crafted 
by the prosecutor, without ever having previously articulated the 
court's findings and conclusions (R. 101-106). 
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The trial court sentenced Mr. Rogers to a prison term of 
zero to five years, and suspended that sentence, placing Mr. Rogers 
on probation for three years (R. 93-94). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prosecutor's findings of fact which the trial court 
signed are copied in appendix 2 and state: 
1. On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics 
Officers Steve Willden and Kevin Judd went to 
Defendant's home to investigate an anonymous 
"tip" in which the caller indicated that a man 
named "Steve", residing at 1935 South 900 East, 
was dealing in large quantities of marijuana and 
there were large amounts in the residence at the 
time. 
2. As they were searching for a place to 
park their vehicle, the police officers saw two 
males and one female, one of them wearing 
clothing consistent with gang membership, enter 
the residence. 
3. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence, 
the officers, Willden and Judd, identified 
themselves and asked to come inside and speak 
with Defendant who identified himself as "Steve." 
4. The Defendant told the officers that they 
could not enter the home and the Defendant 
stepped outside onto the porch to speak with them. 
5. When the officers asked the Defendant for 
identification so they could write their report, 
Defendant said it was inside the residence and he 
would have to go inside to get it. 
6. The officers asked Defendant to leave the 
door open for their safety while he went inside 
and Defendant agreed to leave the door open. 
7. Based on their training and experience in 
narcotics enforcement, the officers were 
concerned about weapons in the house because 
people who deal in narcotics are often armed. 
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8. During the conversation on the porch, 
Defendant appeared nervous and upset and each 
time that he went through the door, he opened it 
only enough to slip in or out. While on the 
porch, Defendant kept the door closed. 
9. After Defendant slipped inside the 
residence, he began closing the door. 
10. At that time, Detective Willden put his 
hand on the door to keep it from closing and 
reminded Defendant that he had agreed to keep the 
door open, thinking that the Defendant had 
forgotten. 
11. At the point in time at which Willden 
used his hand to keep the door from closing, he 
smelled the odor of marijuana coming from within 
the residence. 
12. After Detective Willden smelled what he 
suspected from his training and experience to be 
marijuana coming from within the residence, he 
pushed the door open and stepped inside to secure 
the individuals who might be there and to prevent 
the destruction of evidence. 
13. When the officers entered the residence, 
they explained to Defendant that they could smell 
marijuana and they again asked for permission to 
search the residence. The Defendant denied the 
request. 
14. Detective Judd called for backup help from 
other officers and when they arrived, Judd and 
Willden went to obtain a search warrant based 
upon the information obtained from the anonymous 
phone call, the verification of the individual 
named Steve at the described location, and the 
odor of marijuana. 
15. Upon returning with a Search Warrant, 
the officers found approximately four pounds of 
marijuana, as well as other items connected to 
the sale of marijuana, and arrested the Defendant. 
The trial court's conclusions of law indicate, 
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective 
Willden placed his hand on the door to prevent 
it's closing and this entry was a reasonable 
entry. 
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2. The intrusion into the privacy of 
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by 
the officers7 concern for their safety based on 
their observations of the individual who had 
previously entered the home, their experience 
with individuals who deal in narcotics being 
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home 
possibly alerting other individuals to police 
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons. 
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the 
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to 
leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in 
his nervousness. 
4. The odor of marijuana was detected by 
Detective Willden while he was in a location 
where he had a right to be, i.e. the front porch 
with one hand preventing the full closing of 
Defendant's door. 
5. The second entry into the home occurred 
when Detectives Judd and Willden went inside to 
secure the premises. There was no information 
obtained as a result of that entry that was used 
to provide probable cause for the Search Warrant. 
6. The Search Warrant was valid, being 
supported by legally obtained evidence which 
provided probable cause to search the residence. 
7. All of the evidence being offered by the 
State was legally obtained, without a violation 
of Defendant's rights under either Section 14 of 
Article I of the Constitution of Utah, nor under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. 
8. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied 
and all of the State's evidence is admissible. 
The facts in this case were provided by the testimony of 
two police officers, Detective Willden and Detective Judd. The 
detectives' versions of events coincided in some respects, but 
diverged in others. Two examples illustrate the unsettled facts of 
the case. Detective Willden initially testified that he smelled the 
marijuana after he placed his hand on the door, when Mr. Rogers was 
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resisting Willden's opening of the door (R. 135). Willden later 
testified that by resisting, he meant that Rogers was trying to shut 
his door, but not while Willden had his hand on the door (R. 
160-161)• In contrast, Detective Judd testified that he moved 
forward on Mr. Rogers' porch because he thought there would be a 
"physical confrontation" between Detective Willden and Mr. Rogers 
(R. 179), and testified that there was a struggle between Detective 
Willden and Mr. Rogers to determine if the door would be opened or 
shut (R. 185-186). Judd testified that it was during the struggle 
that Willden claimed to smell the marijuana (R. 187). Detective 
Willden testified that prior to approaching Mr. Rogers7 home, the 
officers witnessed three people, one of them wearing purported gang 
clothing, park a car in Mr. Rogers' driveway and enter the house (R. 
129-130). Judd, on the other hand, did not see anyone going into 
the house prior to the officers' approach (R. 175). 
Given the fact sensitive nature of all search and seizure 
cases, and the unresolved facts of this case, it is particularly 
problematic that the trial court never stated his assessment of the 
facts on the record prior to simply signing off on the prosecutor's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Automatic Control 
Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 
1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with approval in State v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). See also 
State v. Mirouet. Case No. 920066-CA, (Utah App. slip opinion filed 
December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4. 
The following additional facts were not addressed by the 
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prosecutor's findings which were adopted by the trial court, but are 
undisputed in the record and necessary to this Court's assessment of 
this case: 
1. Detective Willden testified at the 
preliminary hearing, but would not admit at 
trial, that the smell he recognized while he was 
forcing open Mr. Rogers' door was the smell of 
unburned marijuana (R. 163-165). 
2. All of the unburned marijuana found in 
Mr. Rogers' home was stored in ziplock baggies in 
locations remote from the door pushed open by 
Detective Willden (R. 142-159). 
3. Detective Judd could not smell marijuana 
until after he entered Mr. Rogers' home (R. 180, 
185) . 
4. In testifying under oath before the trial 
court, Willden admitted that he smelled marijuana 
after Willden forced the door open, when Mr. 
Rogers was resisting Willden's opening of the 
door (R. 135-136). Willden later testified that 
by resisting, he meant that Rogers was trying to 
shut his door, but not while Willden had his hand 
on the door (R. 160-161). Judd also testified 
that it was during a struggle between Mr. Rogers 
and Detective Willden that Willden claimed to 
smell the marijuana (R. 179, 185-186). 
5. In the affidavit used to obtain the 
search warrant, Willden alleged that he smelled 
marijuana when Rogers opened the door to Rogers' 
home. Search Warrant Affidavit, page 2, in 
appendix 4 to this brief. 
6. At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, Willden testified that he forced open 
the door because Mr. Rogers' unwillingness to let 
the detectives into his home made Willden 
nervous, because Willden perceived a danger 
because drug dealers are frequently armed, 
because he had seen a person wearing "gang" 
clothing enter Mr. Rogers' home, and because he 
thought that Mr. Rogers had forgotten to leave 
the door open (R. 130, 134, 135, 136, 161, 163). 
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7. In the affidavit used to obtain the 
search warrant, Willden made no mention of any 
perceived danger prompting him to force open the 
door, and made no mention of forcing open the 
door. He alleged that he smelled the marijuana 
when Mr. Rogers opened the door to his home. 
Search Warrant Affidavit, page 2, in appendix 4 
to this brief. 
8. While Detective Willden testified that he 
requested and forced open Mr. Rogers' door for 
safety purposes, upon entering the house 
containing at least four people, one of whom was 
wearing purported gang clothing, neither officer 
drew his gun, frisked any of the occupants of Mr. 
Rogers' home, or conducted a protective sweep (R. 
136-138, 167, 180-181). 
9. Willden simply announced that he could 
smell marijuana and again asked Mr. Rogers to 
consent to the search of his home (R. 137). 
10. Upon receiving Mr. Rogers' repeated 
refusal to consent to the search, Detective 
Willden conducted no safety-related measures, but 
sent Detective Judd to the police car to call for 
backup while a warrant was obtained and had the 
four occupants of Mr. Rogers' home move from the 
dining room to the adjoining front room (R. 
137-138, 180-181). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In finding the initial warrantless entry into Mr. Rogers' 
home legal, the trial court erred as a matter of law. The trial 
court's ruling turns on the conclusion that the initial entry into 
Mr. Rogers' home was "reasonable." The trial court accepted the 
State's argument that the entry into Mr. Rogers' home was akin to a 
level two Terry stop, and should be evaluated for reasonableness. 
This analysis overlooks fundamental law that in order to enter a 
home, police must have a warrant, or both probable cause and true 
exigent circumstances which are not created by the police as a ruse 
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to evade the warrant requirement. 
The officers in the instant case had no warrant, no 
probable cause, and no reasonable suspicion. There were no exigent 
circumstances here, only a hollow claim of danger made by Detective 
Willden. The officers7 failure to follow through on any safety 
measures upon breaking into Mr. Rogers7 home belies the claim that 
the entry was prompted by concerns of danger to the officers. In 
signing under oath the search warrant affidavit, Willden claimed no 
exigent circumstances justifying his forcing open the door to Mr. 
Rogers7 home, and omitted any mention of Willden7s forcing open the 
door. This further illustrates the mendacity of Willden7s belated 
claims of exigent circumstances. 
When the evidence gleaned from the initial illegal entry of 
Mr. Rogers7 home and/or Willden7s misrepresentations are properly 
redacted from the search warrant affidavit, there is no probable 
cause for the issuance of the warrant. All evidence gained by the 
illegal entry and search following the issuance of the warrant 
should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. ROGERS7 HOME 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I SECTION 14. 
A. PROBABLE CAUSE, NOT REASONABLENESS, IS THE STANDARD THAT MUST BE 
MET TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. ROGERS7 HOME. 
Warrantless searches of homes are presumptively 
unreasonable; to make a legal warrantless entry of a home, police 
must have probable cause and exigent circumstances. It is the 
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State's burden to justify the presumptively unreasonable warrantless 
entry of a home. See Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 748-750 
(1984). When police are making arrests for non-violent and minor 
offenses, the government bears a heavier burden to establish exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Welsh at 
750-753. 
As this Court explained in State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 
1288 (Utah App. 1988), 
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed." The warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment, which is imposed on agents of 
the government who seek to enter a home for 
purposes of search or arrest, is the "principal 
protection against unnecessary intrusions into 
private dwellings." Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized, as a basic 
principle, that "searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable." "Only in a 'few specifically and 
well-delineated' situations, may a warrantless 
search of a dwelling withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, even though the authorities have 
probable cause to conduct it." The State has the 
burden of proving that "the exigencies of the 
situation made [the search] imperative." 
State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988)(brackets by this 
Court; citations omitted). The expectation of privacy in the home 
recognized by the law is so strong that it emanates from the home to 
the surrounding areas: 
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which 
extends the intimate activity associated with the 
'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of 
life,7 and therefore has been considered part of 
the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
Thus, court have extended Fourth Amendment 
protection to the curtilage; and they have 
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defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by 
reference to the factors that determine whether 
an individual reasonably may expect that an area 
immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private. 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)(citation 
omitted). As the Court stated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980), 
Almost a century ago the Court stated in 
resounding terms that the principles reflected in 
the Amendment "reached farther than the concrete 
form" of the specific cases that gave it birth, 
and "apply to all invasions on the part of the 
government and its employes of the sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life." 
Id. at 585 (citation omitted). 
In disregard of the historical recognition of the sanctity 
of the home, the trial court adopted the prosecutor's analogy to a 
level two Terry stop, reasoning that because the entry of Mr. 
Rogers' home was a "minimal intrusion," it was legal if it was 
"reasonable," rather than justified by probable cause. The legal 
conclusions state, in relevant part, 
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective 
Willden placed his hand on the door to prevent 
it's closing and this entry was a reasonable 
entry. 
2. The intrusion into the privacy of 
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by 
the officers' concern for their safety based on 
their observations of the individual who had 
previously entered the home, their experience 
with individuals who deal in narcotics being 
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home 
possibly alerting other individuals to police 
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons. 
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the 
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to 
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leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in 
his nervousness. 
This analysis of the trial court was legally incorrect. 
Because the officers were intruding into a home, probable cause, not 
reasonableness, was the governing standard. A well reasoned and 
detailed opinion, United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 
1988)(en banc), explains the trial court's error in applying a 
reasonableness/balancing standard to the entry of a home. A copy of 
Winsor is in appendix 3 to this brief. In a nutshell, for purposes 
of Fourth Amendment analysis, the less demanding 
reasonableness/balancing test applies only in circumstances wherein 
there is a low expectation of privacy. Because the home enjoys 
perhaps the highest expectation of privacy universally recognized in 
fourth amendment jurisprudence, the reasonableness/balancing test 
does not apply. No intrusion into a home, however minimal, is legal 
unless it is supported by probable cause. See Winsor. 846 F.2d 
1569, 1573-1579. 
For purposes of Article I section 14, the 
reasonableness/balancing test applied by the trial court was an 
incorrect legal standard. As the main opinion explained in State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(plurality), in Utah, once an 
expectation of privacy is established, Article I section 14 applies 
and requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances in order to justify a warrantless search. The main 
Larocco opinion explicitly details confusing federal law wherein the 
probable cause standard and the reasonableness/balancing test are 
inconsistently applied, and opts for the probable cause standard 
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under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 467-471. Given the high 
expectation of privacy that Utahns enjoy in their homes, the 
probable cause and exigent circumstance standard must apply under 
Article I section 14. The trial court's application of the lower 
reasonableness/balancing test was legally incorrect. 
If the probable cause and exigent circumstances 
requirements were watered down to the reasonableness balancing test 
applied by the trial court, it would essentially leave the sanctity 
of the home in the discretion of the police, in contravention of 
fundamental constitutional principles. As the Court explained in 
Pavton. supra, 
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own 
quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to 
society, and the law allows such crime to be 
reached on the proper showing. The right of 
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also 
a grave concern, not only to the individual but 
to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance. When the 
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the 
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a 
judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
government enforcement agent." 
Id. at 586 n.24 (citation omitted). 
The trial court's analysis that the "minimal intrusion" was 
legal because it was reasonable was also based on the trial court's 
failure to recognize that Detective Willden's entry of Mr. Rogers' 
home was a search and seizure requiring probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. In United States v. Winsor. 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 
1988)(en banc), police officers went door to door in a hotel, 
demanding that the residents open their doors during the officers' 
search for a potentially armed bank robber. Id. at 1571. On 
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appeal, the government contended that when the officers demanded 
that the door to Mr, Winsor's room be opened and Mr. Winsor 
complied, no search occurred because the officers did not actually 
enter the room. Id. at 1572. Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating, "To draw a distinction based 
upon whether there had been a physical entry into the premises would 
enable police officers to evade the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
simply by forcing a door open and visually examining the interior 
without crossing the threshold. That the officers gained visual 
access to the interior of a dwelling without physically entering it 
is irrelevant to the question whether a search was effected." Id. 
at 1572. 
Of course, here, Detective Willden went beyond the search 
conducted by the officers in Winsor, and actually crossed the 
threshold of Mr. Rogers7 door when he forced it open. Thus, the 
officer violated the Fourth Amendment right described in Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), as follows: 
"A man can still control a small part of his 
environment, his house; he can retreat thence 
from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they 
cannot get at him without disobeying the 
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of 
liberty — worth protecting from encroachment. A 
sane, decent, civilized society must provide some 
such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, 
some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some 
inviolate place which is a man's castle." 
Id. at 512 n.4 (citation omitted). Just as the officers in 
Silverman breached the Fourth Amendment by eavesdropping by means of 
a device intruding into Mr. Silverman's home, the officers in this 
case breached the Fourth Amendment when Willden forced open the door 
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of Mr. Rogers7 home. 
Additional cases demonstrate that Detective Willden's 
conduct constituted a search and seizure requiring probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. E.g. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 712 (1984)("A 'search7 occurs 'when an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.' . . . 
A 'seizure' of property occurs when 'there is some meaningful 
interference with an individual's possessory interests in the 
property.'")(citations omitted); United States v. Place. 462 U.S 
696, 704-706 (1983)(seizures of personal property may be justified 
with less than probable cause, depending on the extent of intrusion 
on Fourth Amendment interests; searches must be supported by 
probable cause). See also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1136 
(Utah 1989)(when officer opened passenger door to car, this 
constituted a search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967)(police conducted a search and seizure when they monitored 
private phone conversations in public telephone booth by means of 
equipment that did not penetrate the booth); Hernandez v. United 
States, 353 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir.)(when officer squeezed luggage 
to smell suspected marijuana in escaping air, officer conducted a 
search), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); United States v. 
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-1367 (2nd Cir. 1985)(because of high 
expectation of privacy in the home, canine sniff of apartment, in 
contrast to canine sniff of luggage at airport, constituted a 
search), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985). 
-16-
B. THERE WAS NO WARRANT, PROBABLE CAUSE, OR REASONABLE SUSPICION OF 
CRIME TO JUSTIFY DETECTIVE WILLDEN#S ENTRY INTO MR. ROGERS' HOME. 
Because the trial court mistakenly believed that the search 
of Mr. Rogers' home was legal if it was reasonable, rather than 
supported by probable cause and required by exigent circumstances, 
the trial court made no findings or conclusions as to probable cause. 
The officers here had no reasonable suspicion that a crime 
was occurring, let alone probable cause. The anonymous telephone 
caller apparently gave no information other than that a person named 
Steve was dealing large quantities of marijuana from a gray house at 
the stated address (R. 129, 175). This did not support a reasonable 
suspicion, and certainly did not justify a warrantless search of Mr. 
Rogers' home. See Alabama v. White. 496 U.S. 325 (1990)(reasonable 
suspicion was established by anonymous tip, which accurately 
predicted the details of Ms. White's future conduct, and reflected 
the tipster's familiarity with Ms. White); Recznik v. City of 
Lorain. 393 U.S. 166, 169-170 (1968)("Even where a search warrant is 
obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the 
mere fact of an assertion of by an informer. At least as much is 
required to support a search without a warrant.")(citations 
omitted). Mr. Rogers' nervous behavior and exercise of his right to 
privacy in his home do not indicate a reasonable suspicion that he 
was in possession of drugs. See State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 
89-90 (Utah App. 1987)(nervousness in police encounters does not 
support reasonable suspicion); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 494 
and n.ll (Utah App. 1990)(citizen aversion of police contact does 
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not give rise to a reasonable suspicion). Failing to provide a 
reasonable suspicion, these factors fall short of establishing 
probable cause. 
C. THERE WERE NO GENUINE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The trial court approved of Willden's forcing open Mr. 
Rogers' door, reasoning that it was "reasonable" in light of the 
officers' fear of the person wearing a Raiders hat, black jacket and 
black tee shirt, who entered Mr. Rogers' home, and fear of the 
possibility that Mr. Rogers was an armed drug dealer. In contrast 
to the conclusion that Detective Willden's action was justified by 
fear of Mr. Rogers' intentions toward the officers, the trial court 
also found that Willden's actions were justified because Willden 
reasonably believed that Rogers had simply forgotten his agreement 
to leave open the door. His conclusions state, in relevant part, 
2. The intrusion into the privacy of 
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by 
the officers' concern for their safety based on 
their observations of the individual who had 
previously entered the home, their experience 
with individuals who deal in narcotics being 
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home 
possibly alerting other individuals to police 
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons. 
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the 
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to 
leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in 
his nervousness. 
Here again, the trial court applied the incorrect 
reasonableness/balancing standard, in finding that exigent 
circumstances justified the search of Mr. Rogers' home. In order to 
justify a warrantless search of a home, the State must show not only 
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probable cause that a crime has been committed, but also "at least 
probable cause" that exigent circumstances existed. Minnesota v. 
Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). See also State v. Northrup. 756 
P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah App. 1988)("The State has the burden of 
proving that 'the exigencies of the situation made [the search] 
imperative.")(brackets by the Court; citation omitted). While 
danger to the police is an exigent circumstance recognized under 
Fourth Amendment law, jLd., the danger to the police in the instant 
case did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, let alone to 
the requisite level: "at least probable cause." 
Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85 (1979), demonstrates this 
point. In Ybarra. the police went to a tavern to execute a valid 
search warrant for the tavern and a bartender named Greg. The 
warrant was based on probable cause that drugs would be found. Id. 
at 87-88. In executing the warrant, the officers began by 
performing a Terry frisk on the bar patrons, which led an officer to 
eventually discover some heroine on one of the patrons, Mr. Ybarra. 
Id. at 88-89. In seeking to justify the warrantless search of Mr. 
Ybarra, the government argued that the Terry frisk was justified as 
a reasonable frisk for weapons. Id. at 93. After noting that Mr. 
Ybarra was not acting in a threatening manner and was wearing a 
jacket that many tavern patrons wear, the Court found that there was 
no reasonable basis to justify the Terry frisk. Id. at 93. 
Assuming arguendo that it is proper to infer that drug 
dealers are armed and prone to confronting police with weapons, 
because the detectives had no reasonable suspicion that Mr. Rogers 
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was dealing drugs, there is nothing to support a reasonable 
suspicion that he posed a threat to the officers. Assuming that 
Detective Willden did see three people enter Mr. Rogers7 home, and 
that one of those people was wearing a Raiders hat and a black tee 
shirt and jacket, this did not support a reasonable suspicion that 
the officers faced a danger when they were standing on Mr. Rogers7 
front porch. Raiders hats and black tee shirts and jackets are 
common, and just as likely to indicate that the person wearing the 
hat is a member of or a fan of a football team, or following a 
juvenile fashion trend, as to support an inference that the wearer 
is armed and dangerous. Given that the facts of this case would not 
have supported a Terry frisk under Ybarra. it can hardly be argued 
that the facts provide at least probable cause to believe that the 
entry of Mr. Rogers' home was justified by a danger to the officers. 
More importantly, the facts of this case demonstrate that 
it was the desire to investigate, and not the desire to protect the 
police, that led Detective Willden to force open the door of Mr. 
Rogers7 home.1 Law governing the exigent circumstances doctrine, 
1. The trial court7s findings of fact indicating that 
Detective Willden blocked open the door because he was concerned 
about dangers to the officers posed by Mr. Rogers and the occupants 
of his home are clearly erroneous, in that they were induced by an 
incorrect view of the law. See State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 766 
(Utah App. 1990)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without 
adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of 
the law.11). As previously discussed, the trial court applied the 
wrong legal standard (reasonableness) in finding exigent 
circumstances. Further, the trial court simply took Detective 
Willden7s claim of exigent circumstances at face value, without 
evaluating all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Willden7s 
actual conduct. As the following discussion of law demonstrates, 
(footnote continues) 
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which law was apparently overlooked by the trial court, requires 
courts to look beyond claims of exigent circumstances to the 
comprehensive facts of the case. An officer's mere incantation of 
"exigent circumstances" is not dispositive of that issue if his 
actual conduct belies the claim. fl[I]f the officers act in a manner 
inconsistent with a motive to preserve life or property, the 
warrantless entry or search cannot be justified after the fact by 
employing the exigent circumstances doctrine." People v. Duncan, 
720 P.2d 2, 10 (Cal. 1986). 
For example, in United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954 (10th 
Cir. 1987), police officers executed a valid arrest warrant, 
(footnote 1 continued) 
law governing the exigent circumstances doctrine requires courts to 
look beyond a simple claim of exigent circumstances. 
Because the trial court's findings were drafted by counsel 
and adopted by the court in the complete absence of the trial 
court's ever articulating the court's resolution of the facts, the 
findings are entitled to less deference on appeal than would 
normally be due. See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, 
Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), 
cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 
1347 (Utah 1990) . See also State v. Mircruet, Case No. 920066-CA, 
(Utah App. slip opinion filed December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4. The 
deficiencies in the findings, stemming from the trial court's 
failure to state his findings, and from the trial court's inaccurate 
view of the law, should alleviate the need to marshall the evidence 
in challenging the findings. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 
477-478 (Utah App. 1991)(marshalling requirement does not apply when 
findings are legally insufficient). 
Assuming arguendo that the marshalling requirement does 
apply, Detective Willden's testimony that he believed that he was in 
danger (R. 130, 134, 136, 161, 163) is the evidence that supports 
the trial court's findings. However, Willden's testimony is legally 
insufficient to sustain the findings, because under the governing 
law, the facts and circumstances demonstrate that Detective Willden 
was not prompted to force his way into Mr. Rogers' home by concerns 
for safety of the detectives. 
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handcuffing Mr. Bonitz in his home and taking him into custody when 
his parents were present, and then proceeded to search his bedroom 
for two and a half hours. Id. at 955. In sifting through the 
governments numerous attempts to justify the warrantless search, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say in response to 
the claim of exigent circumstances: 
Even though the trial court accepted the 
exigent circumstances justification, the record 
simply does not support such a conclusion. The 
witness who identified the black powder testified 
that it was the type legally and routinely seen 
in bullet reloading shops in quantities "up to 
maybe ten" cans. Standing undisturbed, cans of 
gun powder are inert, whether in a gun reloading 
shop or in a home. Similarly, the hand grenade 
paperweight was not illegal and, even when live, 
a grenade is not dangerous unless disturbed. 
Thus, the only immediate danger that existed was 
created by the officers themselves when they 
entered the secure area and began to handle these 
materials. 
The Government's claim that they believed 
exigent circumstances were present smacks of pure 
unadulterated pretext. The prolonged 
inventory-type search required a total of 
approximately two hours, long enough to examine 
books and manuals one page at a time. Officers 
other than the bomb technician remained in or 
about the room throughout the search. Even more 
significant, the officers made no attempt to 
remove defendant's parents from the home even 
though they now have the audacity to claim that 
the danger was such to threaten a restaurant some 
distance away. Similarly, at no time during this 
prolonged search were neighboring residences or 
business establishments evacuated or warned that 
the risk of an explosion existed. In view of 
their lack of concern for their own safety and 
that of others, we are unconvinced that the 
officers apprehended an emergency which justified 
this extensive examination of a room without a 
search warrant. 
Id. at 957-958 (court's record citations omitted). 
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Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have previously 
rejected claims of exigent circumstances when the officers' conduct 
revealed an investigatory purpose. State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 
1288, 1291-1292 (Utah App. 1988)(trial court's findings of exigent 
circumstances reversed because record demonstrated no exigent 
circumstances); State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 
1989)(officer opened passenger car door and smelled marijuana smoke 
and saw marijuana; because his conduct and testimony reflected an 
investigative intent, rather than fear for his safety, the court 
held that the evidence should have been suppressed). This Court has 
previously recognized that in assessing warrantless searches based 
on exigent circumstances, the scope of the search should be 
"'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justif[ied] its 
initiation.'" State v. Pursifell. 751 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 
1988)(citation omitted). The scope of the search in the instant 
case demonstrates that the search was not tied to the exigency 
claimed to justify it. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Willden testified 
that he forced open the door because Mr. Rogers' unwillingness to 
let the detectives into his home made Willden nervous, because 
Willden perceived a danger because drug dealers are frequently 
armed, because he had seen a person wearing "gang" clothing enter 
Mr. Rogers' home (R. 130, 134, 136, 161, 163). In contrast to this 
testimony reflecting Willden7s supposed fear of Mr. Rogers7 
intentions toward the detectives, Willden testified that when he 
blocked Mr. Rogers from closing his door, he was acting on the 
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belief that Mr. Rogers was simply nervous and upset and had 
forgotten to leave the door open (R. 135). The trial court affirmed 
both of these justifications, failing to note that the 
justifications are contradictory. 
While Detective Willden testified that he requested and 
forced open Mr. Rogers' door for safety purposes, upon entering the 
house containing at least four people, one of whom was wearing 
purported gang clothing, neither officer drew his gun, frisked any 
of the occupants of Mr. Rogers' home, or conducted a protective 
sweep (R. 136-138, 167, 180-181). Willden simply announced that he 
could smell marijuana and again asked Mr. Rogers to consent to the 
search of his home (R. 137)• Upon receiving Mr. Rogers' repeated 
refusal to consent to the search, Detective Willden conducted no 
safety-related measures, but sent Detective Judd to the police car 
to call for backup while a warrant was obtained, leaving himself 
alone with the four occupants of Mr. Rogers' home, whom he directed 
only to move from the dining room to the adjoining front room (R. 
137-138, 180-181). 
Willden's various explanations as to how his conduct served 
a safety interest are also telling. At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, Willden testified that he felt safer with the door open, 
because that enabled him to see into the home to see what was going 
on (R. 161). When trial counsel asked Willden if his purpose in 
approaching the home was to investigate, Willden retorted, "If I 
wanted to look in the house, I could have walked over to the window 
that was open." (R. 159). He then admitted that in light of the 
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availability of the window, there was no need for the door to remain 
open (R. 160)• Willden then turned around on redirect and testified 
that he had not testified that the window was open (R. 172). While 
Willden testified that open doors improve safety because they allow 
an officer to see what is coming (R. 161), he never explained how it 
serves a safety interest for an officer to force his way into a home 
when the resident is resisting the entry. 
Detective Willden7s performance in this case is 
particularly troubling because when he approached the magistrate to 
get a search warrant, he made no mention of forcing open the door to 
Mr. Rogers7 home, or of any exigent circumstances prompting him to 
enter Mr. Rogers7 home. Rather than alleging that he first smelled 
the marijuana when he was forcing open the door to Mr. Rogers7 home 
in response to exigent circumstances, Willden alleged that he first 
smelled the marijuana when Mr. Rogers opened the door to Mr. Rogers7 
home. Affidavit, page 2, in Appendix 4 to this brief. This 
inconsistency, coming from an officer of the law acting under oath, 
underscores the need for the Courts to review with great care the 
officer7s claim of exigent circumstances. 
D. THE SEARCH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF CONSENT OR THE 
PLAIN SMELL DOCTRINE. 
In the trial court, the State argued that Willden7s opening 
the door to Mr. Rogers7 home could be justified on the basis of 
consent (R. 67). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court 
indicated that he recalled the testimony that there was a struggle 
between Mr. Rogers and Detective Willden as to whether or not the 
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door would remain open or shut, but indicated that the court could 
not recall when, in relationship to the struggle, Willden smelled 
the unburned marijuana (R. 109-110). In the prosecutor's findings 
and conclusions, which the trial court signed without ever resolving 
the evidence for himself, the trial court indicated that Willden's 
conduct was "reasonable" in part because Willden believed that Mr. 
Rogers had forgotten his agreement to keep open his door. The 
findings and conclusions do not amount to findings and conclusions 
of consent. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court's findings and 
conclusions can be read as reflective of consent, the findings and 
conclusions are clearly erroneous. The evidence that can be 
marshalled to support such findings and conclusions is Detective 
Willden's testimony that Mr. Rogers agreed to leave open the door to 
his home (R. 11), and Detective Judd's testimony that when Detective 
Willden moved to open the door, Willden stated to Rogers, "I asked 
you politely to leave the door open — " (R. 179). Willden's claims 
of exigent circumstances and his fear of Mr. Rogers contradict the 
claim that Willden forced open the door to Mr. Rogers' home because 
he believed that Mr. Rogers was closing the door because he had 
absentmindedly forgotten his agreement to leave open the door. 
Even if Mr. Rogers did agree to leave open the door to his 
home, it was only after he revoked that consent by closing his door 
and "resisting" or engaging in a "struggle" with Detective Willden 
that Willden supposedly smelled the unburned marijuana. Detective 
Willden testified to the following sequence of events: 1) Mr. Rogers 
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agreed to leave his door open; 2) Mr. Rogers began closing his door; 
3) Detective Willden blocked the door open; 3) Mr. Rogers was trying 
to shut the door and resisting Detective Willden's effort to open 
the door; 4) Detective Willden smelled the marijuana (R. 135-136). 
On cross-examination, Willden testified when he testified that Mr. 
Rogers was resisting Willden, he meant that Mr. Rogers was trying to 
shut his door, but not while Willden had his hand on it blocking it 
open (R. 160-161). Detective Judd testified that it was during the 
struggle with Mr. Rogers that Willden claimed to smell the marijuana 
(R. 179, 185-186). 
Assuming arguendo that Mr. Rogers' consent to leave open 
the door was voluntary, he consented to leave his door open an 
unspecified distance, and did not consent to Willden's crossing the 
threshold in any manner. Given the facts that Rogers never opened 
his door further than necessary for him to pass through it and kept 
the door shut behind him when he went outside to speak with the 
detectives, and that the door was between six to eight inches open 
when Detective Willden forced the door open (R. 135) , the detective 
violated the scope of consent given by Mr. Rogers when he pushed 
open the door. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 
1990)(police violate the fourth amendment if their search exceeds 
the scope of consent given); Florida v. Jimeno. Ill S.Ct. 1901, 114 
L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)(scope of consent is to be determined through the 
application of a reasonable person standard). 
The search of Mr. Rogers' home cannot be justified under 
the plain smell doctrine, because Detective Willden supposedly 
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smelled the unburned marijuana only upon his pushing open the door 
to Mr. Rogers' home, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. e.g. 
Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)("It is, of course, an 
essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be 
plainly viewed.11). 
II. 
ABSENT THE ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO 
THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE, 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT 
DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANT. 
A copy of the search warrant and affidavit obtained by 
Detective Willden is in Appendix 4 to this brief. As is established 
in point I of this brief, at the time that Detective Willden entered 
Mr. Rogers' home without a warrant, he had no reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, or exigent circumstances justifying his action. In 
obtaining the search warrant subsequent to entering Mr. Rogers' 
home, Willden relied heavily on his detection of the smell of 
marijuana, which was illegal. 
In assessing the validity of the search warrant, this Court 
"should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the 
remaining, untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate 
with probable cause to issue a warrant." United States v. Vasey. 
834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987). Accord, United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984). 
The facts alleged by Detective Willden in the affidavit 
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state, in relevant part, 
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd 
was contacted by an anonymous male who stated 
that at 1935 South 900 East, a gray house, there 
was an individual named Steve, who was involved 
in the sale of large quantities of marijuana. 
Detective Judd asked this anonymous individual 
how much was a large quantity. This individual 
stated that Steve was holding one hundred pounds 
of marijuana at this time. This individual would 
not identify himself, and hung up at this time. 
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd 
and your affiant went to 1935 South 900 Esat, the 
address sought to be searched. Contact was made 
at the residence with an individual who 
identified himself as Steve Rogers. Rogers was 
very nervous. Rogers denied your affiants 
request to come into the residence and speak to 
him. Rogers did agree to obtain identification 
from within the residence. As Rogers opened the 
door, an odor of marijuana could be smelled 
coming from the residence. Entry was then made 
into the residence, and Rogers was advised that 
we could smell the marijuana, and was again asked 
for consent.2 Rogers requested a search 
warrant. At which time, he was detained and your 
affiant left the residence, which was secured by 
other members of the Metro-Narcotics Task Force. 
Affidavit, page 2. 
2. As trial counsel noted, Detective Willden did not inform 
the magistrate as to the true circumstances surrounding Willden7s 
warrantless entry into Mr. Rogers' home, which led to the detection 
of the smell of marijuana. Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Motion to 
Suppress, at page 10. It is particularly troubling that in 
discussing the smell of marijuana, Detective Willden alleged in the 
affidavit that he detected the smell when Mr. Rogers opened the door 
to his home, rather than alleging as he testified under oath that 
Willden detected the smell when Willden forced open Mr. Rogers' 
door. Also notably missing from the affidavit are any indications 
that Detective Willden saw any people enter Mr. Rogers' home, that 
Detective Willden saw any person wearing a Raiders hat and a black 
tee shirt and jacket enter Mr. Rogers' home, or that Detective 
(footnote omitted) 
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After redacting the references to the smell of marijuana, 
this Court can see that the remainder of the affidavit, relying on 
Mr. Rogers7 nervousness and assertion of his rights, and on the bare 
allegation of the anonymous informant, is inadequate to establish 
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. See discussion of 
probable cause, supra point IB, and the search warrant affidavit, in 
appendix 4 to this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the trial court sanctioned the 
warrantless entry of a home in the absence of reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause or exigent circumstances. In so doing, the trial 
court never resolved the facts of the case for himself and 
erroneously adopted the State's argument that the entry of Mr. 
Rogers' home could be justified if it satisfied the same standard 
governing a level two Terry stop. In so doing, the trial court 
overlooked the facts of the case demonstrating the falsity of the 
claim of exigent circumstances, and the failure of the detective to 
honestly state the facts in the search warrant affidavit. The trial 
court's gentle approach was apparently based on the State's 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Willden entered Mr. Rogers' home because he perceived a danger to 
himself and Detective Judd. The Detective's falsehoods, which were 
uttered with nothing less than reckless disregard for the truth, 
demonstrate further reason for redacting from the affidavit the 
references to Willden's supposed detection of the smell of unburned 
marijuana. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 172 
(1978) . 
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argument that the detective's forcing open the door to Mr. Rogers' 
home was a only "minimal intrusion." 
The trial court's ruling goes against years of state and 
federal constitutional law recognizing the sanctity of the home, and 
if sanctioned by this Court, would give the police unprecedented 
discretion to violate the sanctity of the home. 
What the Court said long ago bears repeating now: 
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its 
mildest and least repulsive form; but 
illegitimate and unconsitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely, by 
silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure." 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)(citation 
omitted). 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court and 
order all evidence seized in violation of Mr. Rogers' constitutional 
rights suppressed. y 
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden— 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
APPENDIX 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) Case No. 921900105FS 
STEVEN ASHBY ROGERS, ) 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. ) 
Based upon the Defendants Motion to Suppress and the 
testimony of witnesses, arguments, and memoranda of counsel, the 
Court now makes the followings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics Officers Steve 
Willden and Kevin Judd went to Defendants home to investigate an 
anonymous "tip" in which the caller indicated that a man named 
"Steve11, residing at 1935 South 900 East, was dealing in large 
quantities of marijuana and there were large amounts in the 
residence at the time. 
2. As they were searching for a place to park their 
vehicle, the police officers saw two males and one female, one of 
them wearing clothing consistent with gafl^  membership, enter the 
residence. 
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3. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence, the 
officers, Willden and Judd, identified themselves and asked to come 
inside and speak with Defendant who identified himself as "Steve." 
4. The Defendant told the officers that they could not 
enter the home and the Defendant stepped outside onto the porch to 
speak with them. 
5. When the officers asked the Defendant for 
identification so they could write their report, Defendant said it 
was inside the residence and he would have to go inside to get it. 
6. The officers asked Defendant to leave the door open 
for their safety while he went inside and Defendant agreed to leave 
the door open. 
7. Based on their training and experience in narcotics 
enforcement, the officers were concerned about weapons in the house 
because people who deal in narcotics are often armed. 
8. During the conversation on the porch, Defendant 
appeared nervous and upset and each time that he went through the 
door, he opened it only enough to slip in or out. While on the 
porch, Defendant kept the door closed. 
9. After Defendant slipped inside the residence, he 
began closing the door. 
10. At that time, Detective Willden put his hand on the 
door to keep it from closing and reminded Defendant that he had 
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agreed to keep the door open, thinking that the Defendant had 
forgotten. 
11. At the point in time at which Willden used his hand 
to keep the door from closing, he smelled the odor of marijuana 
coming from within the residence. 
12. After Detective Willden smelled what he suspected 
from his training and experience to be marijuana coming from within 
the residence, he pushed the door open and stepped inside to secure 
the individuals who might be there and to prevent the destruction 
of evidence. 
13. When the officers entered the residence, they 
explained to Defendant that they could smell marijuana and they 
again asked for permission to search the residence. The Defendant 
denied the request. 
14. Detective Judd called for backup help from other 
officers and when they arrived, Judd and Willden went to obtain a 
search warrant based upon the information obtained from the 
anonymous phone call, the verification of the individual named 
Steve at the described location, and the odor of marijuana. 
15. Upon returning with a Search Warrant, the officers 
found approximately four pounds of marijuana, as well as other 
items connected to the sale of marijuana, and arrested the 
Defendant. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective Willden 
placed his hand on the door to prevent it's closing and this entry 
was a reasonable entry. 
2. The intrusion into the privacy of Defendant's home 
was minimal and was justified by the officers' concern for their 
safety based on their observations of the individual who had 
previously entered the home, their experience with individuals who 
deal in narcotics being armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into 
the home thereby possibly alerting other individuals to police 
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons. 
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the officers 
believed the Defendant had agreed to leave the door open and had 
forgotten to do so in his nervousness. 
4. The odor of marijuana was detected by Detective 
Willden while he was in a location where he had a right to be, i.e. 
the front porch with one hand preventing the full closing of 
Defendant's door. 
5. The second entry into the home occurred when 
Detectives Judd and Willden went inside to secure the premises. 
There was no information obtained as a result of that entry that 
was used to provide probable cause for the Search Warrant. 
6. The Search Warrant was valid, being supported by 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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legally obtained evidence which provided probable cause to search 
the residence. 
7. All of the evidence being offered by the State was 
legally obtained, without violation of Defendant's rights under 
either Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, nor 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
8. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied and all of 
the State's evidence is admissible. 
DATED this /£) day of July, 1992. 
Approved as to Form: 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
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sequently there are no specific, articulable, 
objective facts which woufd justify the im-
position of warrantless, mandatory urinaly-
sis of the policemen m this case. 
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge, 
dissenting. 
For the reasons set forth in Loworn v. 
City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1359 (6th 
Cir.1988), I must respectfully dissent. 
lfrUTED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
y. 
Steven Dale WINSOR, 
Defendant-Appellant 
No. 86-5179. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 
Argued En Banc and Submitted 
Nov. 9, 1987. 
Decided May 24, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, Richard »£. Gadbois, Jr., 
J., of possessing proceeds taken in bank 
robbery, and he appealed, challenging deni-
al of motion to suppress certain evidence. 
The Court of Appeals, 816 F.2d 1394, af-
firmed. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals, 
822 F.2d 1466, voted that the case should 
be reheard en banc. On rehearing, the 
Court of Appeals, Norris, Circuit Judge, 
held that (1) hot pursuit of bank robber 
into iiotel did not provide sufficient cause 
to Search each room in the hotel, for 
Fourth Amendment purposes; (2) police did 
conduct "search" of hotel room when they 
gained visual entry into room through door 
that was 'opened at their command and 
while they stood in hotel corridor, for 
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Fourth Amendment purposes; and (3) 
search woufd not be reviewed for constitu-
tional propriety through judgment of rea-
sonableness of intrusion by balancing com-
peting interests at stake, but rather, 
bright-line rule that Fourth Amendment 
prohibited searches of dwellings without 
probable cause would be adhered to. 
District Court order reversed; prior 
opinion and judgment of conviction vacat-
ed; and case remanded. 
Farris and Alarcon, Circuit Judges, 
filed dissenting opinions. 
1. Searches and Seizures <£=*43, 44 
Hot pursuit of bank robber into hotel 
did not provide sufficient cause to search 
• each room in hotel, so as to excuse police 
from Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment in searching hotel rooms; hot pursuit 
may excuse police from Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement, but never ex-
cuses absence of requisite degree of suspi-
cion before effecting of search. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures e»176 
Police conduct in searching hotel 
rooms after they pursued bank robber into 
hotel was not immune from constitutional 
attack on Fourth Amendment grounds 
based on fact police operated with consent 
of hotel manager; hotel proprietor could 
not waive his guests' Fourth Amendment 
rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
3. Searches and Seizures G»26 
Each hotel room enjoyed its own zone 
of Fourth Amendment protection, and hotel 
resident's expectation of privacy was not 
reduced simply because he lived in single 
room in low rent hotel rather than in sin-
gle-family house or apartment. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures e»17 
Police conducted "search" within pur-
view of Fourth Amendment when they 
looked into hotel room through door that 
was opened at their command while they 
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stood in hotel corridor. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Searches and Seizures <s=>181 
Search of hotel room conducted by po-
lice gaining visual entry into hotel room 
through door that was opened at their com-
mand while they stood in hotel corridor 
could not be sustained on basis of consent 
on theory hotel room door was voluntarily 
opened; police knocked on the door, identi-
fied themselves as police, demanded that 
occupants open door, and occupant opened 
door on command. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <s==l7, 25 
Intrusivaness of search was measured 
not by its,^ scope, but by expectation of 
privacy upon which search intruded, and 
accordingly, police search of hotel room by 
gaining visual entry into room through 
door that was opened at their command 
while they stood in hotel corridor could not 
be found constitutionally permissible on 
theory that search was not full-blown 
search for evidence requiring probable 
cause, but was at most a limited intrusion 
requiring only reasonable suspicion; no 
search of dwelling could be deemed minor 
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights. 
U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures <£»40 
United States Supreme Court had ap-
parently judicially adopted bright-line rule 
requiring probable cause to support search 
of dwelling. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
8. Searches and Seizures <£=>40 
Police search of hotel room when they 
gained visual entry into room through door 
that was opened at their command while 
they stood in hotel corridor would not be 
reviewed for Constitutional propriety 
through judgment of reasonableness of in-
trusion by balancing competing interests at 
stake; lather, bright-line rule that Fourth 
Amendment prohibited searches of dwell-
* Judge Anderson participated in oral argument 
but died prior <p the issuance of this opinion. 
ings without probable cause would be ad-
hered to. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
9. Criminal Law ^394.4(11) 
Fruits of warrantless search of hotel 
room conducted after bank robber was pur-
sued into hotel would not be found admissi-
ble on ground police conducted the search 
in good faith; good-faith exception to ex-
clusionary rule had been applied only to 
searches conducted in good-faith reliance 
on warrant or statute later declared to be 
unconstitutional, and good-faith exception 
would not be extended to search not con-
ducted in reliance on warrant or statute. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Carlton F. Gunn, Deputy Federal Public 
Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-
appellant 
George B. Newhouse, Asst U.S. Atty., 
San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California. 
Before BROWNING, ANDERSON*, 
TANG, FLETCHER, FARRIS, 
PREGERSON, ALARCON, CANBY, 
NORRIS, BEEZER, and WIGGINS, 
Circuit Judges. 
NORRIS, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant Steven Winsor was found 
guilty by a jury of possessing forty dollars 
taken in a bank robbery.1 See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(c). On appeal he argues that his 
conviction rests on evidence obtained as a 
result of an unconstitutional search of the 
hotel room where he lived. A panel of this 
court affirmed the conviction, holding that 
although the police searched the room with 
only reasonable suspicion rather than prob-
able cause, the search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because it was a mini-
mal intrusion justified by important law 
enforcement interests. United States v. 
Winsor, 816 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.1987). A 
1. He was acquitted on a charge of aiding and 
abetting an unarmed bank robbery. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a). 
U.S. v. 
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limited en banc panel was convened to re-
view the case following a vote of the major-
ity of our active judges. See United 
States v. Winsor, 822 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
We now hold that Winsor's motion to 
suppress must be granted because the 
search of Winsor's room without probable 
cause violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The panel opinion and the judgment of 
conviction are, accordingly, vacated and the 
case is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
I 
In January 1986, Dennis Winsor (appel-
lant's brother, who is not a party to this 
appeal) robbed a bank in Hollywood and 
fled on foot. Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment* (LAPD) Officer Bowser saw him run 
out* of the bank and pursued him to the • 
nearby Chesterfield Hotel, a two-story low* 
rent residential hotel. In response to Bow-
ser's call for assistance, LAPD and FBI 
officers surrounded the hotel and a police 
helicopter circled above. Before entering 
the hotel, the officers were informed that 
no weapon had been seen during the rob-
bery, although the robber had suggested 
he had a gun by holding his hand in his 
pocket. 
The police decided to enter the hotel and 
to go from room to room looking for the 
suspect At each room, two LAPD officers 
and an FBI agent, with their guns drawn, 
knocked on the door and announced: "Po-
lice. Open the door." Tliree residents of 
the Chesterfield who somewhat fit the de-
scription of the bank robber were ordered 
to leave their rooms'to go to the hotel 
manager's office for identification. After 
checking all the rooms on the first floor 
and some of the rooms on the second floor 
(approximately fifteen to twenty-five 
rooms) the officers arrived at the room 
where Steven and Dennis Winsor were liv-
ing When the police knocked on the door 
,a&l demanded that it be opened, Dennis 
Winsor obeyed. The police recognized him 
as the robber, pointed their guns at him, 
and told yim to put his hands up, which he 
did. At this point, the police of course had 
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Probable cause to enter and to search the 
room, which they did. Inside, they found 
appellant Steven Winsor and evidence of 
the bank robbery. Both Winsors were ar-
rested. While in custody, Steven made in-
criminating statements which he later 
moved to suppress along with the evidence 
found during the search of the room. 
II 
[1] The district court denied Winsor's 
motion to suppress on the basis of the 
government's argument that "hot pursuit" 
of the bank robber into the hotel provided 
sufficient cause to search each room in the 
hotel, including Winsor's. We agree with 
the original panel that this was error. As 
the panel stated, "[h]ot pursuit may excuse 
police from the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement, but never does it excuse 
the absence of the requisite degree of sus-
picion before effecting a search." 816 F.2d 
at 1396; see United States v. Scott, 520 
F,2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.1975), cert denied, 
423 U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct 788, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 
(1976). 
[2] The district court also ruled that the 
police conduct was immune from constitu-
tional attack because the police operated 
with the consent of the hotel manager. 
Again, we agree with the original panel 
that this was error because a "hotel propri-
etor cannot waive his guests' Fourth 
Amendment rights." 816 F.2d at 1397 n. 3; 
see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 
489-90, 84 S.Ct 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 
(1964). 
The original panel nonetheless affirmed 
the district court's denial of Winsor's sup-
pression motion. The panel decided that 
the search passed constitutional muster 
even though the police had only reasonable 
suspicion rather than probable cause to be-
lieve that the suspect would be in any one 
of the rooms that had not yet been 
searched, because the minimal intrusion on 
Winsor's privacy rights was outweighed by 
important law enforcement interests. 816 
F.2d at 1398-99. 
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III 
[3] We now turn to the issues as de-
fined by the parties during en banc briefing 
and argument. Before doing so, however, 
we find it helpful to clarify two points that 
are not in dispute. First, at the time the 
police knocked on Winsor's door, they had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
suspected bank robber was inside, but did 
not have probable cause to believe so. Sec-
ond, each room of the hotel, including Win-
sor's, enjoyed its own zone of Fourth 
Amendment protection, and Winsor's ex-
pectation of privacy was not reduced sim-
ply because he lived in a single room in a 
low-rent hotel rather than in a single-family 
house or apartment2 
Winsor argues that the police effected a 
nonconsensual search of the room .when 
they Imocked on the door and commanded 
that' it be opened under claim of lawful 
authority. He argues further that under 
Arizona v. Hicks, — U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the search of 
his one-room residence could not be based 
on a level of suspicion less than probable 
cause. 
The government argues that the police 
did not effect a search when they first 
viewed the interior of the room because 
they had not yet physically entered it. The 
government further argues that even if a 
search without probable cause was effected 
when the police looked through the open 
door into the interior of the room, that 
search was not unconstitutional because it 
"was not a full blown search for evidence" 
requiring probable cause, But was at most 
a "limited intrusion" requiring only reason-
able suspicion. Appellee's Supplemental 
Brief at 5. Such limited intrusions, the 
government contends, may be conducted on 
less than probable cause if the governmen-
tal interest in conducting the search out-
weighs the jntrusion on the privacy inter-
ests of the subject of the search. Finally, 
the government appears to argue that even 
iffjfce search of Winsor's room constituted 
hiore than a limited intrusion, the over-
riding governmental interest in apprehend-
is clear that Winsor's Fourth Amend-
ment rights would have been no less protected 
ing a suspected bank robber outweighed 
the intrusion on Winsor's privacy interests 
and thus, under the circumstances, the 
search was constitutional. 
IV 
[4] The threshold question we must de-
cide is whether the police conducted a 
search within the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment when they looked into Win-
sor's room through the open door while 
standing in the hotel corridor. 
In essence, the government maintains 
that police do not effect a search of a home 
when they force open the front door and 
look inside without crossing the threshold. 
According to the government, "the cases 
are clear that without some form of 'entry* 
into the room, either physical or with the 
aid of electronic or sophisticated visual en-
' hancement, a mere command to open the 
door does not transform a legitimate police 
procedure into a search." Appellee's Sup-
plemental Brief at 2. 
We agree with Winsor that this assertion 
"flies in the face of both precedent and 
common sense." Appellant's Supplemental 
Brief at 1. As the Supreme Court made 
clear in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1967), "the reach of [the Fourth] Amend-
ment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure." To draw a distinction 
based upon whether there had been a phys-
ical entry into the premises would enable 
police officers to evade the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment simply by forcing a 
door open and visually examining the inte-
rior without crossing the threshold. That 
the officers gained visual access to the 
interior of a dwelling without physically 
entering it is irrelevant to the question 
whether a search was effected. We find 
support for our position not only in Katz 
but also in United States v. Johnson, 626 
F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1980), ajfd on other 
grounds, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). In Johnson, police 
had he been an overnight guest of the hotel 
Stoner, 376 VS. at 490, 84 S.Ct at 893. 
U.S. v. 
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standing outside the front door of a home 
arrested a person standing inside the door. 
We rejected the government's argument 
that the arrest was not inside the home 
because the police had not crossed the 
threshold, reasoning that "it is the location 
of the arrested person, and not the arrest-
ing agents, that determines whether an 
arrest occurs within a home. Otherwise, 
arresting officers could avoid illegal 'entry' 
into a home simply by remaining outside 
the doorway and controlling the move-
ments of suspects within...." 626 F.2d at 
757. See also United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3303, 82 
L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (holding that a warrant-
less "search" of a home conducted by moni-
toring a radio transmitter violated the 
Fourth Amendment, noting, "[a]t <the risk 
of belaboring the obvious, private resi-
dences are places in which the individual 
normally expects privacy free of govern-
mental intrusion not authorized by a war-
rant, and that expectation is plainly one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 
justifiable"). 
[5] Neither of the cases relied upon by 
the government undermines our position. 
In United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 
229-30 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 
1008, 93 S.Ct. 442, 34 L.Ed.2d 301 (1972), 
the police, while standing on the front 
porch, looked through a window and saw 
incriminating evidence inside the residence. 
We held no search was effected because 
police merely did what any member of the 
3. We reject the government's further argument 
that any search that may have occurred can be 
sustained on the basis of consent because Den-
nis Winsor "voluntarily" opened the door. Ap-
pellee's Brief at 23. We agree with the original 
panel that "[cjompliance with a police 'demand' 
is not consent." 816 F.2d at 1397. Accord 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49, 
88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). 
Contrary to the suggestion of Judge Farns's 
dissent, this conclusion does not rest on appel-
late fact-finding. The essential facts are not in 
dispute; the district court found that the police 
knocked on the door, identified themselves as 
^police, and "demand[ed] that the occupants 
open the door," and that "Dennis Winsor 
opened the door on command." Excerpt of 
Record at 84-85. On these facts, there can be 
no consent as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bump-
er, 39IOJ.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. at 1791-92 (hold-
WINSOR 1573 
1569 (9th Cir. 1988) 
public was free to do—walk onto the front 
Porch and observe whatever was in plain 
view through an unobstructed window. 
Similarly, in Davis v. United States, 327 
F,2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964), the police did 
what any person could do—they knocked 
oti the front door of a residence, but did not 
use their authority as police officers to 
command the occupants to open the door. 
When the occupant opened the door, he did 
so voluntarily, not, as Dennis Winsor did, in 
response to a claim of lawful authority.1 
In sum, we hold that the police did effect 
a "search" when they gained visual entry 
into the room through the door that was 
opened at their command. 
Having decided that the police searched 
Winsor's room, we now consider the appro-
priate level of suspicion constitutionally re-
quired to justify the search. Winsor ar-
gues that Arizona v. Hicks, — U.S. , 
107 S.Ct 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), con-
trols this case. In Hicks, the police were 
lawfully inside an apartment to investigate 
the source of gunfire reported by neigh-
bors. While inside, one officer noticed an 
expensive stereo that seemed out of place 
in the poorly furnished apartment Sus-
pecting that the stereo was stolen, the offi-
cer moved the turntable slightly to note its 
serial number. The Supreme Court held 
that in moving the turntable, the officer 
effected a search of the apartment which 
w&s unrelated to the lawful objective of the 
Ing as a matter of law that consent to search 
given after police officer asserted he had a 
Search warrant was not freely given); Johnson 
v. United States, 333 VS. 10, 12-13, 68 S.Ct. 367, 
568-69, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (search not volun-
tary where police officer knocked on door, iden-
tified himself, and said "I want to talk to you a 
httle bit"); Ames v. United States, 255 U.S. 323, 
$15-17, 41 S.Ct. 266. 267-68, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921) 
(search not voluntary where law enforcement 
officers identified themselves and told occupant 
that they "had come to search the premises"); 
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 
(9th Cir. 1985) (defendant did not voluntarily 
bpen door of his residence after police, with 
weapons drawn, surrounded the residence and 
Ordered him through a bullhorn to come out-
side), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255, 
% L.Ed.2d 700 (1986). 
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police entry, id. 107 S.Ct at 1152, and that 
"[a] dwelling-place search, no less than a 
dwelling-place seizure, requires probable 
cause." Id. at 1154. Winsor reads Hicks 
as establishing a rule that the police violate 
the Fourth Amendment whenever they ef-
fect a search of a dwelling without proba-
ble cause. 
[6] The government, in arguing that 
Hicks does not control this case, again re-
lies on the fact that the police viewed the 
interior of the room without physically en-
tering it.? Although conceding that "[a]ctu-
aft physical entry by the police into a home 
to conduct a search would be so intrusive 
that probable cause might be required," 
the government contends that "where . . . 
physical entry is lacking, the nature of the 
intrusion changes as a matter of kind, not 
degree, and the 'dwelling place' bright line 
test articulated^oy Hicks is inapplicable." 
Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 9 n. 4. In 
other words, the government argues that 
although Hicks established a bright-line 
rule requiring probable cause for dwelling-
place searches, it is not controlling authori-
ty here because this search "was not a full 
blown search for evidence" requiring prob-
able cause, but at most was "a limited 
intrusion" requiring only reasonable suspi-
cion. Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 5. 
[7] We agree with the government that 
Hicks apparently adopted a bright-line rule 
requiring probable cause to support a 
search of a dwelling.4 Unlike the govern-
ment, however, we find nothing in Hicks to 
suggest that the Court, in establishing this 
bright-line rule, intended to apply it duly to 
what the government labels "full-blown 
searches for evidence." Since Hicks in-
volved the least full-blown search imagin-
able—moving a phonograph to see its serial 
4. The original panel also read Hicks as appar-
ently announcing a bright line rule for dwelling-
place searches. 816 F.2d at 1399 n. 5. 
\ 
5. The sanctity of the home enjoys special solici-
tude in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
That solicitude springs from the language of the 
Amendment^ Jself, which specifically guards the 
"right of the people to be secure in their . . . 
houses." See, e.g.t Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 LEd.2d 
734 (1961) ("At the tery core [of the Fourth 
number—we cannot read it as suggesting 
that the bright-line rule applies only to 
dwelling-place searches that are broad in 
scope. Indeed, Justice Scalia, writing for 
the Court, expressly refused to make any 
such distinction between limited and full 
searches: 
Justice O'Connor's dissent suggests that 
we uphold the action here on the ground 
that it was a 'cursory inspection' rather 
than a 'full-blown search/ and could 
therefore be justified by reasonable sus-
picion instead of probable cause. [...] 
We are unwilling to send police and 
judges into a new thicket of Fourth 
Amendment law, to seek a creature of 
uncertain description that is neither a 
plain-view inspection nor yet a 'full-blown 
.search.' Nothing in the prior opinions of 
/this Court supports such a distinc-
tion 
107 S.Cb at 1154. 
The government cites no authority, and 
we know of none, that a search of a resi-
dence may constitute such a limited intru-
sion on Fourth Amendment interests that it 
may be justified by a degree of suspicion 
less than probable cause. The intrusive-
ness of a search is measured not by its 
scope, but by the expectation of privacy 
upon which the search intrudes. See infra 
Part VI. Because the expectation of priva-
cy in one's home is that most jealously 
guarded by the Fourth Amendment,* the 
Supreme Court has never suggested that a 
search of a home, however limited in scope, 
could ever be considered less than a major 
intrusion. In the absence of such authori-
ty, we follow Hicks in holding that no 
search of a dwelling may be deemed a 
minor intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
rights.6 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to re-
treat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.") 
6. There is no merit in the government's addi-
tional argument that the bright-line rule of 
Hicks should not apply because this was a 
search of Dennis Winsor, not of the room. Ap-
pellee's Supplemental Brief at 4-5. The police 
were looking for Dennis, but they searched the 
room. 
U.S. v. 
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VI 
I8J In the last analysis, the govern-
ment's position is that the search, however 
intrusive, passes constitutional muster be-
cause Winsor's privacy interests were out-
weighed by the law enforcement interests 
at stake. This argument, premised on the 
bold assertion that "[n]o court has ever 
held that probable cause is a necessary 
requirement of a valid search in any given 
context," Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 
#7, is a radical one. Construing the two 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment—the 
proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" and the probable cause require-
ment—the government would apparently 
have us dispense with the probable cause 
requirement and judge every search by its 
reasonableness.7 The reasonableness of 
each search would' be assessed by bal-
ancing the competing interests at stake. 
Thus* the government argues that "the ap-
propriate constitutional* test by which to 
assess [the] reasonableness [of the search 
of Winsor's room] involves a 'careful bal-
ancing of governmental and private inter-
ests.' " Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 
10 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 
325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 LEd.2d 720 
(1985)). The government argues that the 
Fourth Amendment interests sacrificed in 
the search were outweighed by the law 
enforcement interests in apprehending the 
fleeing bank robber. Specifically, the 
government argues that "it is clear both 
from the circumstances requiring this exi-
gent procedure and from the manner in 
which the search was actually conducted, 
that the search was a carefully limited one, 
and that it was the least intrusive means 
possible to accomplish the essential state 
interest of protecting the public from a 
potentially dangerous felon." Appellee's 
Supplemental Brief at 5-6. 
In urging us to apply such a balancing 
analysis in this case, the government relies 
on the following passage from Justice 
White's opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
7. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons,.houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violafed, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
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469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct 733, 740, 83 
L.Ed.2d 720 (1985): 
To hold that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to searches conducted by school au-
thorities is only to begin the inquiry into 
the standards governing such searches. 
Although the underlying command of the 
Fourth Amendment is always that 
searches and seizures be reasonable, 
what is reasonable depends on the con-
text within which a search takes place. 
The determination of the standard of rea-
sonableness governing any specific class 
of searches requires "balancing the need 
to search against the invasion which the 
search entails." 
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 537, 87 S.Ct 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed. 
2d 930 (1967)). The government further 
contends that Hicks implicitly contemplates 
ithe general application of such a balancing 
analysis, citing the following dicta: 
We do not say, of course, that a seizure 
can never be justified on less than proba-
bly cause. We have held that it can— 
where, for example, the seizure is mini-
mally intrusive and operational necessi-
ties render it the only practicable means 
of detecting certain types of crime. 
Hicks, 107 S.Ct at 1154. The govern-
ment's reading of T.LO. and Hicks would 
expand the role of the balancing test in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence well be-
yond the limited place the Supreme Court 
has given it to date. 
As we read T.L.O., Hicksf and other Su-
preme Court cases, the Court has devel-
oped a two-tier approach to the Fourth 
Amendment The general rule is that sei-
zures and searches must be supported by 
probable cause. At the same time, the 
Court has recognized a narrowly defined 
exception to this general rule. A level of 
suspicion less than probable cause may jus-
tify h search or seizure if the intrusion on 
Fourth Amendment interests is minimal, 
and Jf the minimal intrusion is outweighed 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
Place to be searched, and the persons or 
tilings to be seized. 
US. Const, amend. IV. 
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by the governmental interests served by 
the police action. Generally speaking, the 
Supreme Court has defined a minimally 
intrusive seizure as one that occurs in pub-
lic and is brief. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 
(1985). The Supreme Court has assessed 
the intrusiveness of a search, on the other 
hand, by considering whether it invades an 
"expectation of privacy . . . that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable/" 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct at 516 
(Harlan, J., concurring). Specifically, the 
Court has upheld searches conducted on 
less than probable cause when they occur 
in certain clearly defined places which by 
their public nature give rise to reduced 
expectations of privacy. See infra pages 
1577. 
The genesis of the Court's two-tier ap-
proach is, of course, Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
In Terry, a seizure case, the Court upheld 
the brief detention of a person in a public 
place and a "frisk" for weapons based on 
reasonable suspicion rather than probable 
cause. Since Terry, the Court has contin-
ued to refine its two-tier approach. For 
instance, writing for the Court in United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct 
2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), Justice O'Con-
nor explained: 
The exception to the probable-cause re-
quirement for limited seizures of the per-
son recognized in Terry and its progeny 
rests on a balancing of the competing 
interests to determine the reasonable-
ness of the type of seizure involved with-
in the meaning of "the Fourth Amend-
ment's general proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." We 
must balance the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests al-
leged to justify the intrusion. When the 
nature t^ nd extent of the detention are 
minimdfay intrusive of the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests, the oppos-
ing law enforcement interests can sup-
port a seizure based on less than proba-
ble cause. 
Id. at 703,103 S.Ct at 2642 (quoting Terry, 
392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). In Place, 
the Court refused to apply the Terry rea-
sonable suspicion standard because the 90-
minute seizure of luggage in an airport 
was too lengthy to qualify as the sort of 
minimal intrusion contemplated by Terry. 
Id. at 709-10, 103 S.Ct at 2645-46. 
Similarly, in Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 
(1979), the Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that police may take a suspect to the 
police station without probable cause be-
cause the government's interests in crime 
prevention and detection outweigh the in-
trusion on the suspect's Fourth Amend-
ment interests. Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Brennan observed: 
The narrow intrusions involved in [Terry 
and its progeny] were judged by a bal-
ancing test rather than by the general 
principle that Fourth Amendment sei-
zures must be supported by the "long-
prevailing standards" of probable cause 
. . . only because these intrusions fell far 
short of the kind of intrusion associated 
with an arrest 
Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct at 2256 (quoting Brine-
gar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 
S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). 
The Court expressed grave concern about 
the prospect of extending the balancing 
test to more intrusive police conduct 
[T]he protections intended by the Fram-
ers could all too easily disappear in the 
consideration and balancing of multifar-
ious circumstances presented by differ-
ent cases, especially when that balancing 
may be done in the first instance by 
police officers engaged in the "often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." . . . Indeed, our recognition of 
these dangers, and our consequent reluc-
tance to depart from the proved protec-
tions afforded by the general rule, are 
reflected in the narrow limitations em-
phasized in the cases employing the bal-
ancing test. For all but those narrowly 
defined intrusions, the requisite 'bal-
ancing' has been performed in centuries 
U.S. v. 
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of precedent and embodied in the princi-
ple that seizures are 'reasonable' only if 
supported by probable cause. 
Id at 213-14, 99 S.Ct. at 2257 (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 
68 S.Ct 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). See 
also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 
697-98, 101 S.Ct 2587, 2591, 69 L.Ed.2d 
340 (1981) ("[S]ome seizures significantly 
less intrusive than an arrest have with-
stood scrutiny under the reasonableness 
standard embodied in the Fourth Amend-
ment In these cases the intrusion on the 
citizen's privacy 'was so much less severe' 
than that involved in a traditional arrest 
that 'the opposing interests in crime pre-
vention and detection and in the pojice offi-
cer's safety' coujd support the seizure as 
reasonable.") (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. 
at 209, 99 S.Ct at 2254).8 
The Court's two-tier approach also be-
comes apparent from a comparison of cases 
in which the Supreme Court has and has 
not upheld a search on less than probable 
cause. As Hicks and T.L.O. nicely illus-
trate, in the search context, the level of 
suspicion required to justify police action 
turns on the expectation of privacy that 
society will recognize in the place in which 
the search occurred. In Hicks, the Court 
applied the general rule requiring probable 
cause because the place searched—a resi-
dence—is a place where societally sanc-
tioned expectations of privacy are at their 
strongest 107 S.Ct at 1154. In T.LO., by 
contrast, the balancing test was applied 
and the search was sustained on the basis 
of reasonable suspicion because the search 
took place in a public school, where privacy 
interests are necessarily reduced. 469 U.S. 
at 338, 105 S.Ct. at 741. 
8. The Court employed a similar analysis in sev-
eral cases involving stops and brief inspections 
of cars analogous to Terry stops. To illustrate, 
in United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 VS. 873, 
884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), 
*'i ^  the Court said that the border patrol could em-
ploy roving patrols to question occupants of an 
automobile about their citizenship upon reason-
able suspicion that the occupants were aliens 
illegally in the country. The Court noted that 
the intrusion was "modest," involving a stop 
that "usually consumes no more than a minute." 
Aifet 880, 95 S.Ct. at 2579. And, in United 
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The cases in which the Court has applied 
a balancing test to determine whether a 
search could be sustained on less than 
probable cause have involved, without ex-
ception, searches that occurred in places 
where expectations of privacy are necessar-
ily reduced. Thus, the Court authorized a 
governmental employer to search, for 
work-related reasons and upon reasonable 
suspicion, an employee's office, noting that 
"the privacy interests of government em-
ployees in their places of work . . . , while 
not insubstantial, are far less than those 
found at home or in some other contexts." 
O'Connor v. Ortega, — U.S. , 107 
S.Ct 1492,1502, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion). Similarly, the Court has 
held that authorities may search, on less 
than probable cause, the place of business 
of an organization in a pervasively regulat-
ed industry because the regulation reduces 
the expectation of privacy. See New York 
v. Burger, — U.S. , 107 S.Ct 2636, 
2644, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987); United States 
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316, 92 S.Ct 1593, 
1596, 32 LEd.2d 87 (1972). See also Cody 
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S.Ct 
2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (uphold-
ing search of a car trunk upon reasonable 
suspicion after owner no longer had posses-
sion of car); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct 3092, 3096, 49 
L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (upholding an invento-
ry search of an impounded automobile on 
less than probable cause); United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593, 
103 S.Ct 2573, 2582, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) 
(customs officials may, on less than proba-
ble cause, stop and board vessels on inland 
waterways with access to the open seas to 
examine documentation because the brief 
detention of the vessel and inspection of 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543t 557-58, 
96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082-83, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), 
the Court employed a balancing analysis to de-
termine that the border patrol could detain cars 
briefly at fixed checkpoints away from the bor-
der without reasonable suspicion that the mo-
torists might be aliens because the intrusiveness 
of the stop and investigation was minor. See 
abo Delaware v. Prouse, 440 VS. 648, 663, 99 
S.CL 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (police 
can stop vehicles to inspect license and registra-
tion upon reasonable suspicion that the driver is 
unlicensed or the vehicle is unregistered). 
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the public deck area are minimally intru-
sive); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60, 
99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884-85, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 
(1979) (upholding routine visual inspections 
of body cavities of pretrial detainees be-
cause incarcerated persons of necessity re-
linquish expectations of privacy that others 
enjoy); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
606, 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1980, 52 L.Ed.2d 
617 (1977) (upholding routine searches of 
people ajid things crossing the border, 
b&sed on Congress's plenary power to con-
trol the borders); Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 
F.2d 753, 764-66 (9th Cir.) (en banc) 
(government observers may board regulat-
ed fishing boats on a scheduled basis with-
out probable cause, but may not search 
persons, personal effects, or living quar-
ters of the cre#), cert denied, 467 U.S. 
1252, 104 S.Ct.^536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984). 
The Supreme Court has consistently re-
fused, however, to engage in a balancing of 
competing interests or to sustain a search 
on less than probable cause when the 
search occurred in a place where society 
recognizes a strong interest in privacy. As 
noted above, the Court in Hicks required 
probable cause to move a phonograph be-
cause the search occurred in an apartment 
Similarly, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 
U.S. 891, 896, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 
L.Ed.2d 623 (1975), the Court, noting that a 
full search of a car "is a substantial inva-
sion of privacy," held that probable cause 
is required to search an automobile at a 
traffic checkpoint even though probable 
cause is not required to stop the^vehicle. 
In the same vein, the Court held in Almei-
da-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 
273, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 
0973), that a roving unit of the border 
patrol must have probable cause to search 
vehicles in the vicinity of the border. See 
also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94-96, 
100 S.Ct. 338, 343-4 ,^ 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) 
(rejecting argument that reasonable suspi-
cion justifies search of a person detained 
on premises during execution of warrant to 
search premises); Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40, 65-66, 88 S.Ct. 1889,1904, 20 L.Ed. 
2d 917 (1968) (reaching into suspect's pock-
9. As Professor Amsterdam noted: 
et in search of evidence rather than a weap-
on is more intrusive than a Terry "frisk" 
for weapons and cannot be sustained on 
less than probable cause); Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 
1883-84, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (statute 
authorizing electronic eavesdropping on 
less than probable cause violates the 
Fourth Amendment). 
That the Supreme Court has limited the 
balancing approach to discrete places 
where expectations of privacy are necessar-
ily reduced is not surprising. As Justice 
Scalia, the crucial fifth vote in O'Connor v. 
Ortega, — U.S. , 107 S.Ct 1492, 94 
L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), admonished the four-
Justice plurality, a fact-specific case-by-
c&se approach would plunge courts into a 
neverending and essentially standardless 
assessment of every search: 
The plurality opinion instructs the lower 
courts that existence of Fourth Amend-
ment protection for a public employee's 
business office is to be assessed "on a 
case-by-case basis," in light of whether 
the office is "so open to fellow employees 
or the public that no expectation of priva-
cy is reasonable." No clue is provided as 
to how open "so open" must be; much 
less is it suggested how police officers 
are to gather the facts necessary for this 
refined inquiry. As we observed in Oli-
ver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 
[104 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 80 L.Ed.2d 214] 
(1984), "[t]his Court repeatedly has ac-
knowledged the difficulties created for 
courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, 
case-by-case definition of Fourth Amend-
ment standards to be applied in differing 
factual circumstances." Even if I did 
not disagree with the plurality as to what 
result the proper legal standard should 
produce in the case before us, I would 
object to the formulation of a standard 
so devoid of content that it produces 
rather than eliminates uncertainty in this 
field. 
107 S.Ct at 1504-05 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).9 
The varieties of police behavior and of the 
occasions that call it forth are so innumerable 
U.S. v. 
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We appreciate the government's concern 
about excessive constitutional restrictions 
on police conduct We must echo, how-
ever, the Supreme Court's recent reminder 
in Hicks: 
[TJhere is nothing new in the realization 
that the Constitution sometimes insulates 
the criminality of a few in order to pro-
tect the privacy of us a l l— [W]e 
choose to adhere to the textual and tradi-
tional standard of probable cause. 
Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1155. With this admoni-
tion in mind, we refuse the government's 
invitation to decide this case by balancing 
the competing interests at stake. Instead, 
we adhere to the bright-line rule that Hicks 
appears to have announced: The Fourth 
Amendmer^ prohibits searches of dwelling^ 
without ptobable cause. 
[9] We also reject the government's ar-
gument, raised for the first time in its 
supplemental brief filed after en banc ar-
gument, that the fruits of the warrantless 
search should be admissible in evidence 
because the police conducted the search in 
good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1984). The Supreme Court has applied the 
so-called "good faith" exception to the ex-
clusionary rule only to searches conducted 
in good faith reliance on a warrant or a 
statute later declared to be unconstitution-
al. See Illinois t>. Krull, — U.S. , 
107 S.Ct 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). We 
decline to extend Leon's good faith excep-
tion to searches not conductedvin reliance 
on a warrant or a statute. See United 
States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698-99 
(9th Cir.1986) (refusing to apply Leon ex-
ception to search conducted in reliance on 
regulations later determined not to autho-
rize the search at issue). 
The district coiurt's order denying Win-
sor's motion to suppress is REVERSED. 
The panel opinion and the judgment of 
conviction are VACATED and the case is 
REMANDED to the district court for fur-
that their reflection in a general sliding scale 
approach could only produce more slide than 
scale— IJ4 there are no fairly clear rules 
telling the policeman what he may and may 
not do, covrts are seldom going to say that 
what he din was unreasonable. The ultimate 
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ther proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. 
FARRIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I. 
The threshold issue, as the majority ac-
knowledges, is whether the police conduct-
ed a search when Dennis Winsor opened 
the door and exposed his face to the offi-
cers. No search occurred if Winsor volun-
tarily opened the door. See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct 507, 511, 
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Whether Winsor 
voluntarily opened the door is a question of 
fact to be determined from all the sur-
rounding circumstances. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct 
2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Unit-
ed States v. Bitter, 752 F.2d 435, 439 (9th 
Cir.1985). The district court never made a 
finding on the issue because it justified the 
police conduct on the basis of (1) the "hot 
pursuit" doctrine, and (2) the hotel manag-
er's consent to search the rooms. Al-
though I agree that the grounds upon 
which the district court relied were improp-
er, the case must be remanded to the dis-
trict court for findings on the issue of 
voluntariness. Because the majority choos-
es not to remand, but to engage in fact 
finding as a necessary step in reversing a 
criminal conviction, I dissent 
In the order denying Steven Winsor's 
motion to suppress, the district court found 
that 
In any event, there was no search of 
Room 213 which would implicate Steven 
Dale Winsor's Fourth Amendment inter-
ests. The police officers had the manag-
er's permission to look through each 
room of the hotel, and indeed had been 
supplied a pass key for that purpose. 
All the police did when they arrived outr 
side room 213 was to knock, announce 
themselves, and demand that the occu-
pants open the door. Dennis Winsor 
conclusion is that 'the people would be 'secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects/ 
only in the discretion of the police/ 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 Minn.LRev. 349, 393-94 (1974) (foot-
notes omitted). 
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opened the door on command. This does 
not constitute a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Excerpt of Record at 84-85. 
On the basis of these findings, the three-
judge panel that originally reviewed this 
case assumed that Dennis Winsor had in-
voluntarily opened the door. The majority 
now purportedly "agrees" with the panel's 
assumption that the door was opened invol-
untarily: 
We reject the government's further ar-
gument that any search that may have 
occurred can be sustained on the basis of 
consent because Dennis Winsor "volun-
tarily" opened the door. Appellee's Brief 
at 23. We agree with the original panel, 
that "[compliance with/a police 'demand'/ 
is not consent" 816 F.2d at 1397. Ac-
cord Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 
20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). 
Majority Op. at 1573 n. 3. 
The majority cannot "agree" with the 
panel's assumption that Dennis Winsor in-
voluntarily opened the door. The panel's 
assumption was not pivotal to the deci-
sion—the panel ultimately affirmed Steven 
Winsor's conviction and avoided the need-
less gesture of remanding the case for 
findings on the issue of voluntariness. 
Here, however, the majority's finding on 
voluntariness is pivotal. Winsor's convic-
tion can only be reversed if the majority 
finds that Dennis Winsor involuntarily 
opened the door. Fact finding lender these 
circumstances is never appropriate for an 
appellate court. 
The majority denies that it engages in 
fact finding. It argues that the court can 
decide the voluntariness issue as a matter 
of law because the essential facts are not 
in dispute. Majority Op. at 1573 n. 3. 
None of the cases relied upon by the major-
ity, however, support the novel proposition 
that voluntariness can be found as a matter 
of larw. In Bumper and Al-Azzavry, the 
trial courts made findings of fact on the 
issue of voluntariness. The appellate 
courts decidecfonly whether the trial courts 
had clearly erred in making their findings. 
See Bumpe% 391 U.S. at 547-50, 88 S.Ct. 
at 1791-92 and Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at 
894-95. In Johnson, the government nev-
er argued that the defendant consented to 
the search, but that the search was proper 
as an incident to a valid arrest. 333 U.S. at 
13, 68 S.Ct. at 368. The government appar-
ently conceded that the search was not 
voluntary. In Amos, the government ar-
gued the consent issue, but the opinion 
does not indicate whether the trial court 
made findings on the issue. 255 U.S. at 
315, 317, 41 S.Ct at 267, 268. Even if 
Amos had stated that voluntariness could 
be found as a matter of law—which it did 
not—Amos was decided in 1921 and would 
no longer be good law in light of Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct 
2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the leading 
case in the area. Schneckloth expressly 
held that voluntariness is a question of 
fact' Id. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct at 2058-59. 
The majority also engages in sleight of 
hand when it says that the essential facts 
are not in dispute. Certain facts are rele-
vant to the ultimate determination of the 
voluntariness issue, but the essential fact 
question is whether Dennis Winsor volun-
tarily opened the door. As the majority 
recognizes, that issue is in dispute. The 
district court never made a finding on the 
issue because it relied on other grounds to 
justify the police conduct. The district 
court did state that the police demanded 
that the occupants open the door and that 
Dennis Winsor opened the door on com-
mand, but these "findings" were not made 
for purposes of deciding the voluntariness 
issue. Had the district court addressed 
that issue, it would have necessarily con-
sidered the totality of circumstances before 
making a finding on the voluntariness is-
sue. Id. 
The totality of the circumstances includ-
ed more than the fact that the police made 
a demand and that Dennis Winsor opened 
the door on command. The Winsors must 
have known, for example, that they could 
not escape from the hotel. Police had the 
building surrounded, and a helicopter hov-
ered above the two-story structure. The 
police were in the hallway making a room-
by-room inquiry. The district court found 
U.S. v. 
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that "Dennis Winsor was at that very time 
destroying the evidence by altering his ap-
pearance, hiding the clothing in which he 
committed the robbery and flushing other 
evidence of the robbery down the toilet" 
Excerpt of Record at 84. Whether it is a 
reasonable inference from the facts that 
Dennis Winsor, in his altered appearance, 
opened the door voluntarily in an attempt 
to deceive the police so that they would 
move on to the next room is a question for 
the trier of fact I would remand to the 
trial court for a factual determination of 
the issue. 
II. 
Even if this court could properly find 
that Dennis Winsor involuntarily opened 
the door, I would uphold the searchv Ari-
zona tv. Hicks, — U.S. , 107 S.Ct 
1149? 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), does not hold 
that dwelling place searches and seizures 
always require probable cause. The Court 
indicated that searches and seizures of 
dwelling places, although based on less 
than probable cause, can be reasonable if 
they are minimally intrusive and operation-
ally necessary. Id 107 S.Ct at 1154. The 
Court never had to decide whether the 
search in Hicks qualified for this exception 
to the probable cause requirement because 
the government never argued that the 
search was operationally necessary. Id. 
In the case before us, however, the 
search was minimally intrusive and opera-
tionally necessary. The police had a dan-
gerous and purportedly armed bank rob-
bery suspect trapped in a'hotel. They did 
not have probable cause to believe that the 
suspect was in any particular room but 
they knew that he was secreting himself in 
one of the rooms of the two-story hotel. 
The search of the Winsors' room was mini-
mally intrusive because the police required 
only that thfe Winsors open the door to the 
room. The search was operationally neces-
sary because there was no practicable 
mfclns for the police to discover where the 
suspect was hiding. 
The police could have waited indefinitely, 
as the majority would have them do, until 
probable* cause arose. This would have 
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required the police to wait until they could 
pinpoint the room in which the suspect 
could be hiding. The suspect knew that he 
was trapped, however, and he posed a 
grave danger to the occupants of the hotel 
and to the policemen pursuing him. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that the 
police, in requiring Winsor to open the 
door, effected a reasonable search. 
BEEZER, Circuit Judge, concurs in 
Section I but does not join in Section 
II. 
ALARCON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent 
Officer Errol Bowser of the Los Angeles 
Police Department observed Dennis Winsor 
run out of a bank which had just been 
robbed. Officer Bowser pursued Dennis 
' Winsor to the Chesterfield Hotel. Other 
law enforcement units were called upon to 
assist in capturing the bank robber, and 
they arrived within minutes. A police heli-
copter circled overhead during the man-
hunt 
The officers determined that an immedi-
ate search of the hotel for the bank robber 
was necessary. The officers were aware 
that at the time of the bank robbery Dennis 
Winsor claimed that he was armed and 
appeared to be carrying a firearm in his 
pocket The officers knocked on a number 
of doors before arriving at Winsor's room. 
They knocked and said, "Police, open the 
door." The door was partially opened by 
Dennis Winsor. The police immediately 
recognized him as the person who had run 
from the scene of the bank robbery to the 
hotel, notwithstanding the fact that Winsor 
had attempted to alter his appearance by 
shaving his moustache. After making this 
identification, the police pushed open the 
door to the hotel room, at which time they 
saw Steven Winsor. 
The district court concluded from these 
facts that the request that the door be 
opened was reasonable and that the offi-
cers' conduct fell within the "hot pursuit" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirement that law enforcement officers 
obtain a warrant based on probable cause 
1582 846 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
prior to intruding into the privacy of a 
dwelling house. I would affirm the denial 
of the motion to suppress Steven Winsor's 
incriminating statements and the physical 
evidence found within the room after the 
entry. What the majority characterizes as 
a "visual entry" into the partially opened 
doorway was lawful under the "hot pur-
suit" exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
as defined by the Supreme Court in Ward-
en v.*Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct 1642, 
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). 
The majority has reversed the denial of 
the motion to suppress without citing, dis-
cussing or attempting to distinguish the 
decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court that have recognized that where law 
enforcement officers have probable cause 
to believe t^p a suspect has committed a 
felony, thejf may enter a residential build-
ing without a warrant if they have pursued 
the suspect from the scene of the crime. 
Instead, the majority has devoted its ener-
gies to an exhaustive analysis of inapposite 
cases involving the cursory search of a 
physical object within a private residence* 
where the officers had a lawful right to be 
(Arizona i>. Hicks, — U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)), consent to 
search by a hotel manager (Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct 889, 11 L.Ed. 
2d 856 (1964)), the "stop and frisk" excep-
tion to the probable cause requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment (Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)), the transportation of a person to a 
police station in the absence of probable 
cause that he has committed a crime (Dun-
away v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct 
2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)), the search of 
a pervasively regulated industry (United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct 
1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972)), the search of a 
car trunk (Cady v. pombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)), 
the inventory search of a car (South Dako-
ta v. Opppman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct 
3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)), customs 
searches (United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S, 579, 103 S.Ct 2573, 77 
L.Ed.2d 22 (1983}), body cavity searches 
(Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60, 99 
S.Ct 1861, 1884-4&5, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)), 
and the placement of government observ-
ers on fishing vessels to protect sea mam-
mals (Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 476 U.S. 
1252,104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984)). 
None of these cases, however, concern the 
issue presented by the facts before us, 
namely, may officers acting in hot pursuit 
of a bank robber enter a residential build-
ing to arrest him. The Supreme Court 
answered this question affirmatively twen-
ty-two years ago in Warden v. Hayden, on 
facts less compelling than the emergency 
that faced the officers in the instant mat-
ter. 
In Warden, "[t]he police were informed 
' that a robbery had taken place, and that 
the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane 
less than five minutes before they reached 
it" $87 U.S. at 298, 87 S.Ct at 1646. 
Upon these facts, the Supreme Court held 
that the officers: 
4 acted reasonably when they entered the 
house .and began to search for a man of 
the description they had been given 
The Fourth Amendment does not require 
police officers to delay in the course of 
an investigation if to do so would gravely 
endanger their lives or the lives of oth-
ers. 
Id. at 299, 87 S.Ct at 1646. The Court held 
further that "neither the entry without 
warrant to search for the robber, nor the 
search for him without warrant was inval-
id." Id. at 298, 87 S.Ct at 1645. 
In the matter before this court, a police 
officer observed Dennis Winsor running 
from a bank he had just robbed. The offi-
cer pursued him to the hotel where the 
arrest occurred. Thus, unlike in Warden, 
the police here pursued the fleeing felon, 
without interruption from the scene of the 
crime to the residence in which he attempt-
ed to hide. 
In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 
38, 96 S.Ct 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975), the 
Supreme Court applied the hot pursuit doc-
trine in a narcotics case wherein the sus-
pect ran into a residential building to avoid 
arrest. The Court summarized the hot p\u> 
suit rule as follows: 
U.S. v. 
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In Warden v. Hatfden, 387 U.S. 294 [8? 
S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782] (1967), we 
recognized the right of police, who had 
probable cause to believe an armed rob-
ber had entered a house a few minutes 
before, to make a warrantless entry to 
arrest the robber and to search for weap-
ons. 
Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct at 2409. In the matter 
sub judice, it is undisputed that the offi* 
» cers had probable cause to believe that 
Dennis Winsor entered the hotel with a 
concealed weapon after robbing a bank. 
It should be noted that while the police in 
Warden had probable cause to believe the 
bank robber was armed based on informa-
tion from an informant, in Santana there 
was no evidence that the defendant was 
armerf at the time she ran into the resi-
dence. Thus, in Santana, the Supreme 
Court extended the hot pursuit doctrine to > 
a felony arrest in a residence where there 
was no indication that the suspect was arm-
ed. Accordingly, whether Dennis Winsor 
was in fact armed at the time he was 
pursued to his residence is immaterial to 
the application of the hot pursuit doctrine. 
In 1983, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its adherence to the hot pursuit doctrine 
withx respect to warrantless felony arrests 
in residences, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740, 750, 104 S.Ct 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 
732 (1983), but refused to apply this excep-
tion to an entry to make an arrest for a 
minor offense, id. at 754,104 S.Ct at 2100. 
In Welsh, the defendant, was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated, "a noncriminal, 
civil forfeiture offense for which no impris-
onment is possible.,, Id 
As noted above, the majority has failed 
to explain why Warden and Santana do 
not compel us to uphold the district court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. Instead, 
relying onl Hicks, the majority appears to 
hold that officers who have pursued a rob-
,^r from the bank to a hotel may not make 
t "visual entry" into his doorway without 
probable cause. The majority's reliance on 
Hicks is curious. Neither "visual entry" 
without a warrant nor the "hot pursuit" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirements was discussed in Hicks. In 
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fact, in Hicks, the officers had lawfully 
entered a private residence to investigate 
the source of gunfire. Id. 107 S.Ct at 
1152. The very narrow question at issue in 
Hicks was whether the slight movement of 
a turntable in plain view to permit the 
reading of its serial number was a search. 
The majority in Hicks concluded that this 
"cursory inspection" was a search. Id. 
The Court declined to create a distinction 
between a "cursory inspection" and a "full 
blown search" of a physical object located 
within a private residence. Id. The major-
ity has failed to explain how this "bright-
line test" is applicable to the entry of a 
residence by law enforcement officers in 
hot pursuit of a bank robber. Because the 
lawfulness of the entry was not at issue in 
Hicks, the Supreme Court had no occasion 
to discuss or even mention the "hot pur-
suit" ruJe set forth in Warden. 
The majority in the matter before this 
court appears to assume that in Hicks, the 
Supreme Court overruled the "hot pursuit" 
exception sub silentio. I find no statement 
in the Hicks opinion that supports such an 
astonishing interpretation. 
I would uphold the district court's order 
denying Steven Winsor's motion to sup-
press. In 1966, the Supreme Court in-
structed us in Warden that the police may 
enter a residential building to make a war-
rantless arrest if they are in hot pursuit of 
an armed robber. In Warden, the police 
relied on information provided by a third 
party that an armed robber had entered a 
residence a few minutes before they ar-
rived. The Supreme Court found that this 
showing was sufficient to justify a physical 
entry to search for the suspect. In this 
matter, the bank ro66er was pursued from 
the bank to the hotel by a policeman. 
Thus, the arresting officers did not rely on 
hearsay statements as in Warden. Proba-
ble cause was established here by the testi-
mony of a percipient police officer. Be-
cause Warden authorized a physical entry 
into Dennis Winsor's apartment under 
these circumstances, a fortiori, the offi-
cers' "visual entry" was lawful. 
The lawfulness of the entry to arrest a 
bank robber in a residence, because of the 
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hot pursuit doctrine, makes it unnecessary 
for us to address the issues discussed by 
the majority, that is, the distinctions, if 
any, between visual entry and physical en-
try, between a cursory inspection and a 
full-blown search of a physical object, or 
whether Dennis Winsor consented to the 
opening of the door. I must dissent be-
cause I believe that the restrictions placed 
on law enforcement officers in this case by 
the majority are unrealistic, unreasonable 
and could be life-threatening in future 
cases where officers pursue felons to resi-
dential buildings. 
APPENDIX 4 
Search Warrant and Affidavit 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, S.-iLT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IX AND FOR SALT LAKE CCUNTi, sTATZ Or UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, -TATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the Sta:.e of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before 
Detective Steve Willden . I an; satisfied that there i: 
probable cause to believe 
That ( ) on the person!s) of 
( in tne venicie*si cl-scri oeu as 
(Xi on the premises kno.-.n as 1335 South &J0 Ease, a gra; 
stucco, single: family, resxd-nce, with the number- ciea:i> mark-: 
i t. 
r.ne city or Jait Lakt , county or sa_ t i-aKe . otate 
Utah, there ia now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana, scales, packaging materials, paraphernalia, uocumer.ts 
pertaining to or showing: r^bidr.ice, proceeds of narcotic 
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds, 
distribution of a controiitrd substance, and U.S. Currency, 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X; was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, o 
(X) has been used to commit or ccnceal a public offensr. 
(X; is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a ;-.*• 
•wf cortt.it ting or concealing a public <..ff~r.se, or 
iX; consists of a:; : tt-m or constitutes evid^ r:<:e -.-f il"--; 
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SEARCH WARRANT 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED; 
( i in the day r.tme 
(X* at any Lime day or night * good cuuse ka\ ink" been tiiouni 
( ,• to execute without notice of authority or purpose, ; proof 
under oath beina shown that the object or* thi* search aiaj-
be quickly destroyed *..r disposed of or that harm ma.-
result to any person if notice were given; 
to ~ake a search cf the above-named or described personls), 
vehicle!**), and premises for tae here i:i-ab ;ve describee property or 
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to 
the order of this court. 
GIVtN t'XDES MY HA\*D and dated this 2- day ci- J^£i^V. n% 
IN THi£ THIRD C I R L L I T COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IS AND FOR SALT LAKE COLNTi', STATE Or UTAH 
STAiE OF LTAK ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: />»<~t j < 450 South 2nd East 
JID'^E ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That \ ) on the person!s) of 
t ) in the vehicle!s) described as 
(X) on the premises known as 1335 South 300 East, a gray 
stucco, single family, residence, with the numbers clear!'-" marked or. 
it. 
In the City of 5^ \LT_ LAKE , County -.jf Salt Lake, 3t-te of 
Utah. ~':\eve is ncu certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana, scales? packagin* irateriais, paraphernalia, doc ji;;e::*.s 
pertaining to or shoeing: residence, proceeds of narcotic 
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds, 
distribution of a controlled substance, and U.S. currency. 
and rh.ir said property or evidence: 
(\i WHi ur. .a'..fully ac'iua^ci or Is unia'. i'ul^ y p-..is •»•-?-: *•=•• . L : 
(X) has b*ren used ;o e coin; it or conceal >.-. p...;bi_c off^iibe. ;: 
i\) is being possessed with the purp^s^ to use ii as z. r.:eri-..vr 
of con:nii tting or cunceaiing a public offense, i-r 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes e\ idence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
( ) consists of an item or constitute* evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. ..'Note requirements of Utah C-.-de 
Annota; ed , ~ 7-2 '-"-3 ( 2 ) ] 
Affia.:t br.-iieves t;.e propert> and evidence urs•*. ibed a b ^ e is 
:\ice::e of the .:ri::ie,s) of DISTRIBUTION OK A CCNTKOLLED SuBS ^ >-CE/ 
POSSESSION- OF A C0NT30LLKD SUBSTANCE. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to estabiibh the irounus for .ssuan:e of a sea:c;i wa; runt-
are : 
Yjur affianc is Detective currently assigned to the Metro-
Niircoiici Task Force. Vour affiant has been a police officer f^r ten 
years and experience in narcotics investigation for over two .-ears. 
Your affiant has received Training in narcotics trafficking fro:a 
JEA, Department of. Justice, FBI, and numerous seminars. 
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd was contacted by v.n 
anonymous maie who stated that at it»35 Suut:: Sou East, a gray h^.uSr, 
there was an individual named Steve, who was involved in the bale of 
large quantities of marijuana. Detect i'. e Judd asked this anon* -mo us 
individual how much was a large quantit:- . This individual stated 
that Steve was holding one hundred pounds of marijuana at this tirue. 
This individual would not identify himself, and hung up at this tim*;. 
On December 2nd, 1S91, Detective Judd and your affiant went :.o 
1935 South 900 East, the address sought to be searched. Con;act was 
made at the residence with an individual who identified himself as 
3" eve Rogers. Rogers was very ner.ous. Rogers denied your affiants 
request to come into the residence and speak to him. Rogers did 
agree to obtain identification from within the residence. As hogers 
opened the door, an odor of marijuana could be bmeilec comin* frj.;i 
the residence. Entry was then made into the residence, a no Rogers 
was advised that we could smell the marijuana, and was agai:. nsk-rd 
for consent. Rogers* requested a search warrant. At which tin;-, he 
was detained and your affiant left ti.e residence, which wab secured 
by other members of the Metro-N'arcctijs Task Force. 
Your affiant has smeiiel marijuana on numeious ether occas .:.-iis • 
and knows from his experience and training what marijuana smell* 
like. Your affiant believes from the information reoe.ve; froc. the 
anonynous c.tizen and from the smell of marijuana within uhe 
residence, that marijuana will be found within tne residence sji.ght 
to be searched. 
You.* affiant lb an experienced :.oiice officer and :.:•;: t hnt 
experience knew that scales, paehag.nu r:aterluis? paraphernal- a, 
documents pertaining to or sho^im.: i s*-d.--r:c-*, proceeds of r.arc. i ic 
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trv f f ic.-.ir.g proceeds, 
distribution of a controlled substance, arte I'.S. currency are founc 
where narcotic trafficking is taking place. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Ycur atiiant considers tht;
 L:\ foi mation rece.-ea fr->m t::- c:::f iaeiitial 
informant reiiabie because (if any information is ootained frc-?» an 
unnamed source! 
The anonvmous citizen contacted the >:eLro->'.-irccti:s Scr-kc Force o;. 
i2 *"* *i» >rki::g off his own free will. He is nor. a paid inforir.ar.:, or is 
any type of criminal charges. Your affiant knows m; leaser: for the 
anonymous indi\ iduai tu have calied with faisr: info: million concerning 
rhe distribution of marijuana, ir.-.'m the reside::c»r sought tc be 
searched. 
Your affiant, has verified the above inf crinat iun frcr. the confident iai 
informant to be correct and accurate through ihe following 
independent inves t igation: 
VKEREFORE, t.he affiant prays 
seizure of said ite^s: 
that a Search W.-irrant oe issued for U:e 
\ J i n cne aa*. t i m e . 
, X; a t a n y t i m e da;, c : n i g h t b ^ C a U i - t h e r e - i s r e a s - . n t o 
b e l i e ' - e i t i s n e - e s » a r y u sei.*:e t h e p r c p e ; t y p r i .>r t o :. t 
be.lr.s4* c o n c e a l e d , d .cs ' ro**e i , t;a;r.a-*e<. • ..»r a i t e r e - J , o r _'oi-
o t h e r g j c d r ea s ; r ; , ^ - w . t : 
i n e resjici^nct* . s c u r r e n t . L ei :g se ,?u.*e<: 
*s cur .vent-:- nig 
Yo...r affitnt see 
it time, 
.s Z . J 
.* light 
affiar.t do**s net **ish Z> detain the resiience an- lo.ia 
serve the warrant immediate! v rather t*.an wait uati- th 
hours. You 
th.in is i.-ecessai-v. 
AFFIANT c —::—^ 
Nu. 
Tiie oersonai property (listed b*±„o^ / ^ et o^ :. •->;: cht.* inventor:-
a'.tacned hereto) was r.aken iron, uie cre-ni 
-es .u« A'.rG ana aescnbea 
as 193." South soC EasL, a ara;- stucjo. si.fi.e . .i::;ii> , res iu.^ n; -*i, 
uiih the numbers c^-ariy mark'-d or* it. 
and from the vehicle! s) described a<* 
ana rrcm tne Person;si u: 
by virtue o:" a searc:i warrant daf-d the c .i v c i U e o e in rj e r « 
y * i. 
a r:c e v e ? u t e <JL O V O U•;;. = e rt e e -= e 
o : t n e i .oove e n t i t i e a cou r* 
L.A:vl C 'JL . ' . . i f 5 1 A i XL '«.< " L i Aft 
CIRCUIT . 0 1 R 7 . IN A;iL* FOR SAL" 
^ 1 1 1 JJ e ii <"h :::: t n i s ^ a r . a n t ' - a s e . e i v t e a 
uo swcctr m a t . t r i e a r c a c n e c ; m v e . . t c r y : o n t a i : . - 5 z . r u e a n a 
d e t a i i e u a : c o u r . : . of ;*I1 t h e ; - r o r ^ : ^ . y t a i . e n b " ne :.t.id':r t n e ^ i r r a : ; 
on t n e 2nd d a y of Z'-ecember, i. ri b i 
Ai : of the proper : : v calven by v i r t u e o:' sa;«i w a r r a n t u-i . i be 
r e t a i n e d in my c u s t o d y s u b j e c t t c t h e o r d e r o : t h i s c o u r t or or a.iy 
o*.h-*r c o u r t in which t h e o i ' f e r . se i n r e s p e c t ;o which t h e p r o p e r t y 
o r t h i n g s t uk^n , i s t r i a o l e . 
i^a—-
o u o s c r i o e a ar.a £^<o^Lp: zo o e t e r 
;
* - " ^ V 
I.WENTCRY LIoT 
C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e : 
A oai ' cc r . t a ip ._r z' a o o r o d a a t e i v o r e 
A bag c o n t a i n i m 
mar i . iuana. 
\ w c o a £ s ** i.. n a o t r c x 
. .'una c : :::ar*.juana. 
in : ; i te iy cr.e ounce of 
A nag c c n : : a n : n ^ a p p r o x i m a t e - - sever , u'ranrs o . ;: 3i i o e y : j i a 
mu->hroon:s . 
inr«re Ddgs cun- .a i . ' i in* app romn .a ' 
l i a r , j u a n a . 
»o Dour.'.vs of 
A baa containing approximate!, one pound of ir.ari.iur-na . 
A bag centalni ~u 2 croas-icp?, • -us pev*tec. ainph-. tannines ; . 
Paraphernalia: 
"CLI" Scale, >io \: LCD 2 C J 1 . 
c.haus icale, : 5 lb. s-r. ie, >lj .: li : s ri\m ; , wit.; venous 
s ize wr-i a:h.ts . 
Metai bj.\, "Oreo Sand*- ich " . w;th se^ds and ^ter.-, 
t fix .li.ar pr.one 
5 6 0-819 '1' 
-
::n ^ ratteries ana cnarger, 
.w-;ee i iar.eous ao:uT,e:;ti, re:;-:.:.:, ano pao-f-rH 
Pachas':ng materials anc 3 bo:,e.-^  of bags. 
Syringe, mirror, and glass vial wit;: wnite 
Ohaus triple beam scale. 
Ci^ar box witn rrisce iiareous paraphernalia. 
Co2 Regulator. 
rlreMres : 
!a:-1 f - r•'•. d , ::: • a H . : :; 11 , £ v\ 
, L *:.n;u; our:, o 5:1-."^:.; 
iFirearms, continues): 
-^C : S i x , 12 ?au? f c j , b i i o t s u r . r o u n d s , ( a m m u n i t i o n ) . 
P a g e D. > k n e y : 
= ID: s 2 , 5 2 0 . u u , i n l . r . c u r r e n c y . 
P a * e £ . P a r a ; ; h e r : : a i : c : 
- I E : vvni te power s u p p i * b o x K i t h a t t a c h e d l a m p . 
= 2Z : W h i t e power s u p p l y z~"pe b o x . 
- • : £ : Box c c n ^ a i r i r u : 2 i : . r ^ e l a m p s . 
= -E: Bex contain.:n£ h*~Grcoa::ic tubing. 
= 5 £ : Tvv<; b o x e s : c : i t a i n i : : 2 p i a s t . c o u c . v ^ t s . 
- t Z : i : o u r power c o n v e r t e r • i e c t r - c a l d e v i c e s . 
I yJ L r. O O A ; • 
- ~ Z ; Two c o w e r o u ^ o i i e s a n d two . a m p s , •••it.: 
f r l e c t r i c a i i qu ipT . . - : : : i n c a r i b c a r c bo : : . 
-S-E: i'v.o e l e c t r i c a l - c r . v e r t t - r s . 
= i Z : C e l i u i a r c.v.uie i n s r ; r : p a c k . 
= 1 0 1 : Xunwrous i : - rT^ l-el .>r.-i.vz : o hvdror-ho.ii--.- ^vsr.em 
